North Korea omission raises alarms for extended deterrence

The Nuclear Consultative Group, a South Korea-U.S. body created to coordinate extended deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear threat, held its fifth meeting in Washington last week. However, the joint statement issued afterward did not mention “North Korea” at all. It said the allies “reaffirm their commitment to provide extended deterrence to South Korea by utilizing the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear forces.” All references to North Korea that had appeared in previous statements, including warnings about the North’s nuclear threat and the regime itself, were omitted.

The meeting was the first in 11 months since the fourth round in January and the first since the launch of the second Donald Trump administration and the Lee Jae-myung administration. That the consultative body for strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella, established under the 2023 Washington Declaration by the two leaders, continues to operate despite leadership changes in both countries is notable. Critics, however, point out that the latest joint statement was less than half the length of earlier versions and omitted key elements, including warnings about the potential end of the North Korean regime, references to joint planning and execution, and commitments to increase the visibility of strategic assets. They argue the omissions highlight how discussions on extended deterrence between South Korea and the United States have increasingly lost substance.

The meeting was the first in 11 months since the fourth round in January and the first since the launch of the second Donald Trump administration in the United States and the Lee Jae-myung administration in South Korea. That the consultative body for strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella, established under the 2023 Washington Declaration by the two leaders, continues to operate despite leadership changes in both countries is notable. Critics, however, point out that the latest joint statement was less than half the length of earlier versions and omitted key elements, including warnings about the potential end of the North Korean regime, references to joint planning and execution, and commitments to increase the visibility of strategic assets. They argue the omissions highlight how discussions on extended deterrence between South Korea and the United States have increasingly lost substance.

Still, diplomatic efforts to draw North Korea into dialogue are unlikely to succeed without credible deterrence to prevent nuclear provocations, raising concerns that an overly conciliatory approach could encourage miscalculation by Pyongyang. There is no need to provoke the North, but demonstrating deterrence remains essential. South Korea’s pledge, under an agreement with the United States on alliance modernization, to sharply increase its own defense spending and take a leading role in conventional defense was based on a reciprocal strengthening of U.S. deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear threat. While recent alliance consultations have included more omissions and streamlining, they should not give the impression that the nuclear umbrella itself has been weakened.