Bills outline new prosecution system, spark ruling backlash

On Jan. 12, the government issued advance legislative notices for bills outlining the structure and operations of the Public Prosecution Office and the Serious Crimes Investigation Office, both slated to launch in October alongside the abolition of the Prosecutors’ Office. The bills clearly stipulate that prosecutors at the Public Prosecution Office will be prohibited from initiating investigations and will be limited to filing indictments and maintaining prosecutions. The Serious Crimes Investigation Office would be responsible for investigating nine categories of major crimes, including corruption, economic crimes, insurrection and foreign aggression, and large-scale disasters. However, the government’s proposal has drawn strong opposition from hard-line lawmakers within the ruling camp over plans to divide the agency’s workforce into legally trained investigative judicial officers and investigation-focused specialist investigators. Critics argue that this structure risks creating a de facto second prosecutors’ office, setting the stage for friction during deliberations in the National Assembly.

The government’s decision to place investigative judicial officers within the Serious Crimes Investigation Office appears largely intended to encourage a substantial number of prosecutors to transfer to the new agency. As the dismantling of the prosecutors’ office, which has existed for 78 years, draws closer, concerns about potential gaps in investigative capacity remain widespread. The newly established office will need time to take root, and if prosecutors choose not to transfer, there is a risk that investigative expertise long accumulated within the prosecution could be lost.

Even so, some lawmakers in the ruling party and figures within the legal community question whether it is necessary to assign legally trained personnel to the Serious Crimes Investigation Office once the Public Prosecution Office is in place. Critics further argue that a personnel structure divided between investigative judicial officers and specialist investigators closely resembles the current prosecutor-investigator model, raising concerns that the prosecution could be easily revived in the future. Even if the broader framework is preserved, the government should consider ways to address these concerns.

Confusion over jurisdiction must also be prevented in advance. Laws governing investigations assign responsibilities among agencies based on the type of crime and the status of suspects, but cases involving multiple individuals and overlapping charges are common. As seen during the early stages of the martial law investigation, when the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials, prosecutors and police launched parallel probes, competition among agencies can create confusion and waste investigative resources. Conversely, when agencies shift responsibility onto one another, investigations can be delayed. While the government has stipulated that the Serious Crimes Investigation Office may request the transfer of cases involving the nine major crimes from other investigative bodies, it should adopt a more precise institutional design to prevent potential disputes over investigative jurisdiction.

The government has said it will consider whether to grant prosecutors at the Public Prosecution Office the authority to conduct supplementary investigations during future revisions to the Criminal Procedure Act, a key unresolved issue in prosecutorial reform. However, hard-line lawmakers within the ruling camp have strongly opposed any retention of investigative powers by prosecutors. The possibility of abuse of supplementary investigative authority must be carefully guarded against. At the same time, investigations must not fall short to the extent that the truth is obscured or the completeness of indictments is compromised. Remaining tasks in prosecutorial reform, including the question of supplementary investigations, should be resolved with a focus on safeguarding public interests and fundamental rights through the effective exercise of the state’s penal authority.