Factional tensions mount within Democratic Party

The failed merger between the Democratic Party of Korea and the Rebuilding Korea Party offered the first unmistakable sign that the Democratic Party’s centrist and pragmatic supporters, often described as “New Lee Jae-myung,” have amassed enough influence to reverse a decision endorsed by the party leadership.

Lawmakers said they were flooded with text messages opposing the merger from New Lee Jae-myung supporters and were taken aback by the scale and intensity of the backlash. The episode underscored to party leaders that this emerging bloc now wields sufficient leverage to contest the traditional liberal mainstream, long aligned with supporters of former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in.

New Lee Jae-myung supporters also revealed a clear emotional and ideological distance from the Rebuilding Korea Party. They appear uneasy with party leader Cho Kuk’s image, frequently criticized for perceived double standards, and skeptical of progressive policy proposals such as public land ownership. While the Democratic Party’s established mainstream framed the merger as a natural extension of shared political roots, the New Lee Jae-myung camp was less persuaded by arguments for aligning with a party widely regarded as further to the left.

The bloc’s influence could grow further depending on President Lee Jae-myung’s performance. With Lee’s approval ratings currently outpacing those of the party, continued gains in the Kospi index and a stabilization of housing prices could expand the Democratic Party’s appeal. There are also indications that men in their 20s and 30s, a demographic the party has struggled to retain in recent years, are gravitating toward the New Lee Jae-myung camp. As the People Power Party under Chairman Jang Dong-hyuk pivots more firmly toward its conservative base associated with former President Yoon Suk Yeol, some centrist conservative voters may also reassess their political alignment.

The challenge is that as New Lee Jae-myung consolidates its influence, friction with the party’s traditional mainstream is likely to deepen. The bloc’s centrist, pragmatic orientation diverges from the long-standing ideological current associated with the so-called 586 generation, a cohort of former student activists now in their 50s who attended university in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s.

Another clash between New Lee Jae-myung and the traditional mainstream could surface at any time. One potential flashpoint is whether to retain the prosecution’s supplementary investigative authority, an issue that has already exposed differences between President Lee and hard-line lawmakers in the party. Other policy legacies of the Moon Jae-in administration, including the nuclear phaseout, North Korea policy and relations with Japan, could likewise revive ideological fault lines.

In that scenario, veto sentiment within the New Lee Jae-myung camp could turn toward hard-liners closely identified with the traditional mainstream, including party leader Chung Cheong-rae and figures from the 586 activist cohort. The president’s fan cafe, Jaemyung’s Village, has already expelled Chung, Supreme Council member Lee Sung-yoon, who is aligned with Chung, and Rep. Choi Min-hee. Observers view the move as a sign that these figures have repositioned themselves in firm support of President Lee’s governing approach, consistent with the New Lee Jae-myung camp’s orientation. Friction between the New Lee Jae-myung bloc and traditional mainstream supporters, including the online outlet Ddanzi Ilbo and prominent commentators such as Kim Ou-joon and author Rhyu Si-min, has continued to intensify.

At the party’s August national convention, where Chung, Prime Minister Kim Min-seok and former party leader Song Young-gil are cited as potential contenders, the divide between candidates backed by New Lee Jae-myung and those supported by the traditional mainstream could bring latent ideological differences into the open. In the aftermath, the party risks splitting into pro- and anti-leadership camps centered on the next chairperson, potentially prolonging internal discord.

Ultimately, the critical variable is whether the party leadership can reconcile differences between New Lee Jae-myung and the traditional mainstream while maintaining its broadened coalition. An expanded support base offers a rare strategic opening. Yet if tensions with existing loyalists are mismanaged, that advantage could quickly become a source of fragmentation. How effectively the Democratic Party of Korea manages coexistence between these two forces is likely to prove decisive in the 2028 general elections.