[Editorial] Inter-Korean Summit Needs to be Looked at Objectively

We should not expect too much from a couple of rounds of summit meetings between Roh and Kim. The president has less than three months in office. And what the leaders of the two Koreas signed yesterday, the “10.4 Joint Statement,” is disappointing and worrisome. It seems as if they have achieved something great from the outside, but it is very doubtful whether the statement carries any significant meaning as there are many areas that are missing or vague.

It is praiseworthy that President Roh is trying to establish peace on the Korean peninsula even during his last minutes in office. It is desirable that two leaders of the Koreas meet as often as possible. However, at the moment, we need to examine the joint statement because the cost of delivering what is in the statement will be borne by the Korean people. North Korea’s nuclear programs are not mentioned properly in the joint statement. This shows that the aspirations of Koreans as well as the countries of the six-party talks have been disregarded.

A government official agreed in the clause 4 that, “In order to resolve the nuclear issue, the joint efforts of both Koreas will be exerted to follow through the six-party talks, 9.19 joint statement, and 2.13 agreement,” and this shows that the nuclear issue has been mentioned. The government thinks this is enough because the nuclear issue is being discussed in the six-party talks. Who is the government trying to fool, really?

As was shown at the 10.3 Beijing agreement, North Korea excluded its existing nuclear weapons and materials on the list of items to report this year, making many doubt its intentions. As the North has not been trustworthy, president Roh should at least have reaffirmed the 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This will make engaging in cooperation with the international community much more difficult than before. It is pitiful that the “nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula” was used, instead of “North Korea’s nuclear issue” on the joint statement.

One cannot help feel that the South made compromises on the Northern Limit Line issue as well. In Clause 3 of the joint statement, it says, “The joint fishing area will be determined in order to prevent accidents in the West Sea, and defense ministers of the South and North will discuss ways to make this area peaceful waters.” It says “discuss,” but it is very likely that the South will make compromises. Making matters worse, “The passing of Haeju by civilian vessels” as stated in Clause 5 means that the South Korean government will virtually allow military provocation by the North.

The NLL should be viewed from a broader perspective, because it is directly linked with safeguarding the Seoul metropolitan area. It says “joint fishing waters” on the statement; however, a skirmish can always develop into a military conflict. A good example is the incident that occurred in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in 1976. Soldiers of the North and the U.S. were involved in a deadly incident where North Korean soldiers axed to death an American soldier who was cutting. branches of a tree that crossed over the border and a U.S. aircraft carrier was mobilized. Creating something “joint” between South and North Korea can still be very dangerous.

Aid to North Korea and economic cooperation have problems, too. More than 90% of projects named as part of expanding South-North economic cooperation will be paid for by the South. Establishing the “West Sea Peace Cooperation Special Zone” in and around Haeju, building a special economic zone, building a shipbuilding cooperation complex in Anbyon and Nampo, repairing and improving railways between Gaesong and Shinuiju, and repairing roads between Gaesong and Pyongyang will all be billed to the South.

This rash of development is justified with the phrase, “The balanced development of the people’s economy and common prosperity” in Clause 5, but South Korea’s taxpayers are the ones that will foot these bills. For the last 10 years during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, a few trillion won has been spent on aid to North Korea. The government’s plan to repair and repave railways and roads is expected to cost 703 billion won. The administration needs to heed many voices of financial concern in the South.

What is more resentful is North Korea’s attitude. The North does not seem thankful; rather, they looked like they were mocking us. A textbook example is the reopening of the Gyeongui Line (Munsan – Bongdong). The reopening of this railroad had been put off due to the opposition by the military, even though there had been a previous agreement to do so. Now the North is patronizing the south that it will so generously reopen the railway. But there is a condition attached: It is only for freight for the Gaesong Industrial Complex, not for people as that would push the secluded North to open up further.

North Korea is demanding South Korean companies make “bold” investment decisions, expand the SOC, and develop natural resources in the North. But North Korea is evading its responsibilities of building roads, telecommunications lines, and customs procedures, three critical areas, and offering vague promises of when it might do so. This shows that it is not willing to push for true reform. Under these circumstances, a cycle of “economic aid – peace aid,” which is what President Roh has been emphasizing, can never be established. A fundamental change in the way of providing economic aid and engaging cooperation with the North is needed.

We have been giving support and concessions to the North, but there is not much we have gained. Clause 3 that states, “A summit meeting involving three or four state heads in order to change from the armistice agreement to peace regime,” will likely never take place. The U.S. is demanding the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs. China, too, even though it signed the armistice (1953), may have a conflict of strategic interests with the U.S. when it comes to the Korean peninsula. Such a clause is an attempt by North Korea trying to take credit for itself.

Asking the South to hold an inter-Korean prime ministerial meeting in November in Seoul showed Kim’s ulterior motives. The issue could have been discussed in the ministerial meeting, but the North did a favor for the president and the ruling party. The North is ‘allowing’ the South to use the meeting to earn more votes from the public in the presidential election, because the issue concerned does not carry enough weight to be discussed by the prime ministers of the two Koreas. Although a return visit by Kim Jong Il would have been more helpful for the ruling party to win the hearts and minds of the people, this was addressed vaguely by the statement, “The leaders of the two Koreas will talk to each other and discuss pending issues.”

What is the most problematic about the statement is related to putting words into action and the issue of trust. These two values need to be put in a virtuous cycle in order for the inter-Korean relationship to develop in earnest. Agreements without delivering what was agreed will deepen distrust, and this is what we have experienced for the past five decades. When the DJ administration cheered and said, “The war is over,” due to the 6.15 joint statement after the first round of inter-Korean summit, to many people’s dismay, military conflicts in the West Sea occurred in 2002. In addition, until last year, the North was involved in testing of nuclear weapons.

During his three-day stay in Pyongyang, President Roh learned that his northern counterpart is indeed a peculiar person. He changed schedules and even asked Roh to extend his stay by one more day, which is considered very rude in the diplomatic world. President Roh watched North Korea’s propaganda mass games and even gave them standing ovation. He proposed a toast wishing long life for Kin Jong Il. All these point to a clear direction: there is still a long way to go before the two Koreas can achieve reunification.