South Korea’s pragmatic return to nuclear reality

The government’s decision on Jan. 26 to proceed as planned with the construction of two nuclear power plants and one small modular reactor under the 11th Basic Plan for Power Supply and Demand marks a clear shift in energy policy. Finalized last February through a bipartisan agreement, the plan reflects a growing recognition that additional nuclear capacity is essential to secure low-cost, carbon-free electricity. That reality has become more urgent as South Korea pursues its goal of becoming one of the world’s three leading artificial intelligence powers while safeguarding its manufacturing competitiveness. President Lee Jae-myung’s recent remarks that public opinion overwhelmingly supports nuclear power have now been translated directly into policy.

Climate, Energy and Environment Minister Kim Sung-hwan said Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power will soon begin a site selection process for two large-scale reactors with a combined capacity of 2.8 gigawatts, aiming to secure permits in the early 2030s and complete construction around 2038. Public sentiment appears firmly aligned with the government’s direction. Recent surveys show strong support for new nuclear construction, with nearly 70 percent of respondents in a Gallup Korea poll backing the move. Kim also left open the possibility of extending the operating lives of existing reactors within safety limits, signaling a more flexible and pragmatic approach to nuclear policy.

The decision merits a positive assessment for dispelling lingering concerns that nuclear construction could stall under an administration that has emphasized renewable energy. At the same time, it brings into sharper focus a set of unresolved challenges that cannot be overlooked. Reactor site selection has repeatedly triggered deep and prolonged divisions within local communities, often pitting residents against one another for years. In the past, abrupt policy reversals have only compounded the damage, leaving canceled projects and long-lasting distrust toward the government.

Equally formidable is the challenge of delivering nuclear-generated electricity to where it is most needed. The prolonged delay in expanding the Dongseoul substation, the final section of a 280-kilometer ultra-high-voltage transmission line linking the East Coast to the Seoul metropolitan area, illustrates how infrastructure bottlenecks can undercut energy policy. While recent agreements to route transmission lines underground have eased some constraints, the issue of securing stable power supplies for major industrial hubs such as the Yongin semiconductor cluster remains unresolved.

For South Korea, a global manufacturing powerhouse that relies entirely on imported fossil fuels and faces structural limits in renewable energy efficiency, nuclear power as a baseload source is less a policy option than a necessity. Seen in that light, the government’s decision marks a welcome move away from sterile debates over nuclear phaseout toward a more practical, reality-based energy strategy. The task now is to convert that strategy into concrete results by reducing social conflict, rebuilding public trust and deploying scarce energy resources with maximum efficiency.