People Power Party suffers historic election defeat

Lawmakers of the People Power Party (PPP) had maintained since December of last year, when early presidential elections became likely following the December 3 martial law incident, that “at least the opponent is Lee Jae-myung, so it's a winnable fight.” While the crisis in the conservative bloc was as grave as the 2016 impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, they believed that since President Lee had high disapproval ratings among conservatives and moderates, the party could win the election as long as it remained organized.

For this belief to become reality, however, the PPP needed to reduce its own disapproval rating, which rivaled or exceeded Lee’s among the public. Yet time and again, the party chose actions that only alienated moderates and rational conservatives further.

The worst-case scenario for conservatives was a presidential race between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. To avoid this, the PPP first needed to cross the political “river” of martial law and impeachment. Instead, it opposed the party-wide adoption of an impeachment stance. Lawmakers rushed to Yoon’s official residence in Hannam-dong, reviving the long-buried image of “asphalt conservatism” from the Liberty Korea Party era. Some even echoed the absurd claim that “it’s not martial law, it’s enlightenment law.” As a result, the party wasted four full months until Yoon was officially removed from office on April 4.

When the Constitutional Court issued an 8–0 ruling to dismiss Yoon, the PPP belatedly began preparing for the election. Inside the party, many still claimed that hope remained. They argued that if the primary featured a “touching” contest among well-known figures like Ahn Cheol-soo, Oh Se-hoon, Yoo Seong-min, Han Dong-hoon, and Hong Joon-pyo, they could defeat President Lee. Their confidence stemmed from the fact that these candidates appealed to centrist voters.

However, the PPP leadership did not prioritize selecting a candidate with general election viability. Instead, they clung to a primary rule that included an anti-strategic-voting clause, restricting participation to party members, PPP supporters, and politically unaffiliated voters. This made it appear that the leadership was more interested in handpicking a candidate who aligned with its preferences rather than selecting someone who could defeat Lee. Former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min dropped out even before the race began.

Just before the primary started, the party leadership suddenly floated the idea of drafting Han Duck-soo. Many suspected this was an early move in a post-election power struggle. Worse, this wasn’t even a call for Han to join the primary, but a proposal for unification after the primary. This baseless suggestion led Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon to also bow out.

Eventually, the PPP leadership went so far as to attempt a forced replacement of Kim Moon-soo, who had been nominated through the official primary. This unprecedented political maneuver alienated not just moderates but also rational conservatives.

One PPP insider remarked, “The party never took the right path, always relying on underhanded tactics.” After months of scheming, even pressuring Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party to merge candidacies in the final days fell flat. Lee had no reason to accept.

What remains after six months of missteps is the second-worst presidential defeat since democratization. And still, not one figure has stepped forward to take responsibility, even after President Lee’s inauguration. Though they should now grasp the need to follow the righteous path, the party appears unchanged. If they are once again calculating behind the scenes, they may soon face an existential crisis.