[Editorial] Summit or Farewell?

After the summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and President Bush, the two leaders seem to have nothing much to show except for their rhetorical efforts. They met in Washington and discussed North Korea’s nuclear program, the withdrawal of wartime operational control and other major issues. But they succeeded only in confirming their different positions. The summit result is a great disappointment because it failed to live up to the high expectations of Koreans who hoped that the meeting would reduce the uncertainty over security issues and internal tensions. More importantly, post-U.S.-Korea summit conditions on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia are likely to worsen.

First of all, imposing sanctions on North Korea will become a more divisive issue. Even before the summit, the U.S. has made it clear that it will press forward with additional sanctions under the U.N. Security Council’s resolution on North Korea (Resolution 1695) with or without South Korea’s approval. The U.S. even sent out an official document to around 190 U.N. member states asking for their participation in cutting off virtually all channels North Korea maintains for trade and international transactions. If U.S.-Korea relations were normal, U.S. authorities would have sought an agreement with South Korea in whatever form it took. However, the two countries’ outright disagreement on the matter prohibited any meaningful discussion.

At the summit, President Roh acted irresponsibly by saying, “While North Korea is already under sanctions imposed following the U.N. resolution and America’s domestic law, it is premature to discuss another sanction. South Korea’s decision to stop shipping rice and fertilizer to the North is a sanction in itself.” Pro-North Korean leftists who are Kim Jong Il sympathizers might welcome the president’s remarks. The fact is that if the U.S. decides to impose sanctions on North Korea, there is practically nothing South Korea could do about it. Moreover, it has been reported that starting on September 19, Japan will effectively freeze withdrawals or overseas remittances from accounts related to North Korea.

On the stalled six-nation talks front, though Roh attempted to emphasize them, he sounded empty. Roh and Bush reportedly agreed to build a “common, comprehensive approach” to getting the disarmament talks back on track. Still, neither of them could explain the details of the “common approach.” Roh simply called it “complicated.” Prevailing interpretation of the approach is that they will explore a reasonable solution while putting both the freeze of Pyongyang’s nuclear program as mentioned in last year’s September 19 Joint Statement and a package of compensations on the negotiating table. If this really is their “common approach,” they must have forgotten that it is the tricky point that is blocking the resumption of the nuclear talks. No one will be fooled by the leaders’ smart rhetoric.

The two leaders made no progress on the return of wartime operational control (OPCON), either. Many Koreans expected from this summit a breakthrough that would allow a grace period or delay the withdrawal itself. Yet the two presidents reaffirmed the already well-known withdrawal principle that “the schedule for the withdrawal will be negotiated at the annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in October.” No progress means that the negotiations over wartime OPCON will follow the existing schedule whether the actual return date will be in 2009 or in 2012. After all, the summit proved fruitless for the Koreans who loudly protested against the withdrawal.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, “The withdrawal of wartime OPCON will serve U.S. interests.” China and Russia will be pleased about Korea’s recovering its wartime OPCON because they think the return will increase their influence over the Korean peninsula. For Japan, there is no reason they should say no to the decision because it will strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and improve its military and diplomatic status. Considering all the positive fallout from the withdrawal on neighboring countries, one cannot but doubt that the return of wartime OPCON serves Korea’s national interests.

It is very regrettable that the summit meeting, which might be the last one during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, produced so few tangible results. The Washington Post, in its commentary, said, “They succeeded in covering up their disagreement. But the summit produced neither agreement nor alternative.” People are also doubtful about the sincerity of President Bush’s emphasis on the continued stationing of the U.S. soldiers in Korea and his country’s commitment to security on the Korean peninsula.

If what those in the Roh administration want is not an end to the alliance with the U.S., they must change their attitude. The ROK-U.S. alliance has been a major contributor to Korea’s emergence from an impoverished nation to a prosperous democracy in an unprecedentedly short period of time. The alliance is too important to be undermined by an administration whose head will be leaving the office in a year. More seriously, Korea is being tested more severely than during the Cold War in this critical time of China’s economic rise and Japan’s military buildup.

To the north, China not only attempts to falsify Korea’s ancient history, but also reveal its hegemonic ambitions by igniting a territorial dispute. To the south, Japan has entered a stage where even nuclear armament is discussed in public. Calls for self-reliance and expressing anti-American sentiment will not help. Rather, restoring the ROK-U.S. alliance and cooperation towards their previous state will help. At least, the return of wartime OPCON should be postponed. The Roh administration should avoid leaving a collapsed ROK-U.S. relationship behind as its legacy at any cost.