[Washington’s Policy on Korean Peninsula] <2> American Hawk’s Direct Hit

On one early December afternoon, in the midst of a light snow flurry, I entered the U.S. administration building in the middle of Washington D.C. Inside, I was reminded of the underlying reality of terrorism fear in America. Days before the visit, I had been required to hand in my birth dates and passport number and go through an identity scan, but upon arriving at the building that day, I once again had to go through a couple more scanners. Visitors had to wait in the lobby for a considerable time until an employee assigned to guide the visitor to their appointment arrived, and a full line of people were still waiting for this set of procedures to start for themselves.

At last, after about 20 minutes, I was seated with a related authority that called himself a right wing hawk regarding North Korean nuclear issues. Possibly due to the interview’s anonymity, a background briefing, he poured out all his opinions and even raising his voice when saying, “If North Korea exports its nuclear capabilities to a third country, the U.S. does not have any other choice but to take military measures.”

―What is the difference in the North Korean policies between the Clinton and the Bush Administration?

“We approach the North Korean issues such as nuclear issues, bio-chemical weapons, non-proliferation policies, and human rights all comprehensively, but the Clinton Administration tried to resolve them one by one. However, their way has already failed.”

There are criticisms that the Bush Administration has drawn a certain line, stepped back from the North Korean nuclear issues, and lacks an active attitude in the problem solving.

“If they are talking about the red line [boundary line], that means a military measure. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has recently mentioned that the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis will go on as long as we can approach the target point (North Korea on the nuclear issue) and that is the most proper expression that describes our current position.”

He paused to think for a while and resumed saying, “The U.S. is reluctant to say exactly what “red line” means. The red line during the Clinton Administration meant re-handling of the nuclear. However, North Korea has violated this, and the Clinton Administration did not take any military measures. If they speak but not act, the trust toward the U.S. and its cause is diminished. One red line for sure is the exporting of North Korean nuclear weapons to a third country.”

The six-party talks have gone over the year without settling its next meeting schedule…

“The second meeting will be held some time in mid-January or in early February for sure. We cannot be sure of its productivity. We will soon find out. Of course, I feel very unpleasant about the North Korean attitude when they said they would participate at the second meeting but have been delaying it.”

Does U.S. believe that North Korea can give up its nuclear power through the six-party talks? Or is it just taking preliminary steps to rationalize its strong policies toward North Korea?

He answered without hesitation, “Both.” He added, “The six-party talks are still the best method. We do not know where its end is yet, but if North Korea does not give up on nuclear weapons and brings the talks to failure and even if the U.S. has to bring the nuclear issue to the UN or take other strong measures, the U.S. will give much more credit to China and Russia.”

But, Seoul speaks that a militaristic action is not part of the strong policies.

Even before my question finishes, he asked, “Why is that?” with an expression on his face that suggests he cannot understand it. His calm voice has become an excited and raised one.

“Why and who does speak that way? That’s a shame. Instead of saying that, they had to say that the militaristic action will bring much sacrifice and so that it is much more of a loss that a profit to take the act now. However, if North Korea starts to export nuclear weapons or nuclear materials, it will be very hard for them to say that the U.S. will not take military action. And the rest of the world will agree with the U.S.’s decision.”

After taking a pause for a while he resumed speaking.

“Even if it is not so, it does not matter. From the longer perspective, military measures can prevent other great sacrifices. Also, we can think of the possibility that North Korea will exert a limited attack in some regions of South Korea to claim their demands. We have prepared scenarios for all the possibilities and have contingency plans for them. We do not mean that we practice them immediately now, but we have to be prepared for emergencies.”

That is far off from the peace and prosperity policy of the Roh Moo-hyun government.

“I cannot remember the exact words, but President Roh has said during his campaign and in his early term that he “would bring peace into the Korean peninsula no matter what the cost is” and that “Korea will not participate in a possible war between North Korea and the U.S.” Those words were not helpful. We have signed security pacts with Korea. These remarks are unwanted.”

What is the biggest difference between the U.S.’s view toward North Korea and the Korean one?

“We consider the nuclear materials that North Korea possesses as an international threat, but Korea tends to consider it as a regional issue. We have to be concerned about other potential countries that might buy nuclear weapons from North Korea, but Korea does not seem so.

I heard that Washington’s opinion on Cheong Wa Dae’s Diplomacy and Security Team is negative….

“It is different for young advisors such as Ra Jong-il, national security advisor, and Bahn Ki-mun, diplomacy advisor. These two straight shooters are idealistic, but we talk casually on the differences between Korea and the U.S. However, interestingly enough, I heard one of the Korean authorities at the Ministry of Diplomacy call one of the young advisors in Cheong Wa Dae, a Taliban. There seems to be some dichotomy between Cheong Wa Dae and the Ministry.”

Jung-Ahn Kim credo@donga.com