Seoul must break blame cycle in tariff talks

Since the inauguration of the new government, South Korea’s negotiations with the United States have followed a familiar script. A surprise announcement from Washington, often delivered by U.S. President Donald Trump, is followed by a swift response from the presidential office, which dispatches senior officials to the U.S. capital to manage the fallout. The envoys leave under visible strain and return saying they clearly conveyed Seoul’s position, helped Washington better understand it or secured a measure of acceptance, all while stressing the seriousness of the situation.

Last month’s episode unfolded in much the same way after Trump informed Seoul that a 25 percent tariff on South Korean goods would be reinstated. As tensions escalated, the minister of trade, industry and energy, the minister for trade and the foreign minister traveled to Washington one after another. They came back without tangible results. When efforts to sway the U.S. side proved unsuccessful, attention shifted to other explanations. Trade, Industry and Energy Minister Kim Jung-kwan pointed to delays in the National Assembly’s passage of a special act on South Korea-U.S. investment. Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo said U.S. officials did not fully grasp the differences between the two countries’ institutional frameworks. The message was that responsibility lay with the legislature and with gaps in U.S. understanding rather than with the administration itself.

Officials overseeing diplomatic and security affairs offered a more pointed assessment. During a parliamentary interpellation on Feb. 9, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer had told him in Washington that absent progress in talks over non-tariff barriers, the United States would attempt to narrow its trade deficit through higher tariffs. The remark indicated that non-tariff barriers were central to Washington’s decision. National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac warned that instability in the tariff arrangement could extend into the security domain, comments widely viewed as a rebuke of the trade authorities’ approach. Kim, for his part, insisted the tariff issue would return to normal once the pending legislation clears the Assembly.

The divergent assessments underscore a broader pattern of shifting responsibility outward. Delays in the National Assembly, structural differences between Seoul and Washington, and the issue of non-tariff barriers are framed as constraints beyond the administration’s direct control. The collapse on Feb. 12 of a parliamentary special committee charged with advancing the investment bill only reinforced that narrative. As U.S. demands grow more fluid and pressure mounts, this dynamic risks creating a buffer that shields policymakers from accountability.

Breaking the cycle of deflection, renewed setbacks and hurried damage control will require a collective reassessment at the highest levels of government. Officials must ask candidly whether the stalemate can genuinely be explained by the pending legislation alone, particularly after repeated high-level visits have failed to alter the course of events. When different ministries cite different causes, counterparts in Washington may conclude that Seoul lacks a unified internal position. Such perceptions of fragmentation could inflict longer-term harm, potentially outweighing the immediate impact of higher tariffs.

Even if months of sector-by-sector talks were needed to produce the Joint Fact Sheet endorsed by the two leaders, its implementation demands sustained coordination between trade and diplomatic channels. If circumstances warrant, Seoul should consider convening a South Korea-U.S. foreign and trade ministers’ two-plus-two meeting. Presidential tariff announcements delivered via social media can no longer be treated as anomalies. In trade diplomacy, preparing for volatility is not optional but fundamental.