Why disbanding the Counterintelligence Command matters

The civilian, government and military joint special advisory committee formed to pursue military reform recommended on Jan. 8 that Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back dismantle the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command. The command currently oversees counterintelligence operations, national security investigations and military security audits. Under the recommendation, investigative functions would be transferred to the Defense Ministry’s Investigation Headquarters, which supervises military police, while counterintelligence duties and security audits would be reassigned to two newly created bodies tentatively named the Defense Security Intelligence Agency and the Central Security Audit Group. If implemented, the move would bring an end to the command 58 years after the establishment of its predecessor, the Army Security Command, in 1968.

This outcome can only be regarded as the command’s own making. Instead of focusing on its core mission of preventing espionage, it became deeply involved in an illegal attempt to impose martial law. Yeo In-hyeong, the former head of the Counterintelligence Command, ordered the arrest of more than 10 politicians, including leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties, on the day martial law was declared. Arrest teams equipped with handcuffs and binding ropes were dispatched to the National Assembly. Before the declaration, Yeo wrote in a memo that an “unstable situation” needed to be created, invoking North Korea. Investigative powers granted to apprehend spies were instead used to pursue political figures targeted by former President Yoon Suk Yeol, revealing an intent that risked plunging the country into a national security crisis.

Former President Yoon sought to turn the Counterintelligence Command into an instrument of personal loyalty. After appointing Yeo, a junior from his alma mater Chungam High School, as commander, Yoon reportedly summoned him frequently to a safe house in Samcheong-dong to discuss martial law plans up until just before its declaration. The command’s predecessor, the Defense Security Command, had long been embroiled in controversy over illegal political involvement, including online comment manipulation during presidential and parliamentary elections under the Lee Myung-bak administration and surveillance of families of the Sewol ferry disaster victims under the Park Geun-hye administration. Although the agency was effectively dismantled as a result, it was revived as the Counterintelligence Command under the Yoon administration. Its increasingly overt collusion with political power ultimately led to its use in an anachronistic, palace-guard-style coup attempt.

Despite wielding immense power by combining intelligence gathering and investigative authority, the Counterintelligence Command operated largely beyond effective oversight. To prevent it from being exploited by political power again, democratic external controls must be strengthened. At the same time, separating intelligence collection from investigative functions must not result in weakened counterintelligence capabilities. Effective safeguards are essential. Counterintelligence capacity should be significantly enhanced to ensure that delayed responses, such as last year’s mishandling of the leak of a list of undercover agents from the Defense Intelligence Agency, are not repeated. The dismantling of the command should serve as an opportunity for counterintelligence bodies to focus strictly on their core mission and to ensure they are never again drawn into politics.