Delayed population plan reflects policy complacency

The year ultimately turned over without resolution. The fifth Basic Plan for a Low Fertility and Aging Society for 2026 to 2030, which was supposed to take effect this year, has yet to be released even after the start of the new year.

The Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society is a comprehensive national blueprint formulated every five years since 2006 under the Framework Act on Low Fertility and an Aging Society. Much as the five-year economic development plans once guided industrialization and economic growth, the plan has set the broad framework and strategic direction for South Korea’s response to its demographic crisis.

South Korea entered a low-fertility phase in the early 1980s, when the total fertility rate fell below 2.0. In 2002, it became an “ultra-low fertility country,” with the rate dropping below 1.3. As the decline in births became entrenched as a structural problem, the government enacted the Framework Act on Low Fertility and Aging Society in 2005 and implemented the first basic plan the following year. Through the first through fourth plans, many of today’s core policy measures to address low fertility, including parental leave, childbirth incentives, free childcare and child allowances, were introduced and institutionalized. Without these basic plans, childbirth and childcare policies scattered across ministries would have struggled to take shape in a coherent and timely way.

This time, however, the plan failed to produce even a draft by year’s end and ultimately missed its intended launch. At a minimum, a broad framework must be finalized by the end of the previous year to allow budgets and personnel to be allocated for the first year and related systems to be prepared. It is highly unusual for a legally mandated national plan to miss even its most basic timeline.

In fact, this outcome was partly predictable. Amid prolonged political turmoil following the declaration of martial law at the end of 2024, interagency discussions stalled, and momentum weakened further after the change of administration. The Presidential Committee on Low Fertility and Aging Society, tasked with guiding the basic plan, was effectively left unattended without new appointments. The situation worsened last September, when a proposal emerged to reorganize the committee into Population Strategy Planning Committee, while a vice chair appointed by the previous administration continued to lead in an awkward interim arrangement. A committee official said uncertainty over the organization’s future made substantive discussions with relevant ministries even more difficult.

The president also showed little engagement. Serving nominally as chair of the committee, the president has neither convened nor presided over a single meeting since taking office. The population policy unit within the presidential office was downgraded to the secretary level, and that post has remained vacant for six months since the new administration began. Discussions on revising the Framework Act, including the proposed committee reorganization, have likewise seen little progress.

This atmosphere was likely influenced in part by a modest rebound in the number of births and the fertility rate. After hitting a record low of 0.72 in 2023, the total fertility rate has edged higher, supported by post-pandemic conditions and an increase in marriages. The Ministry of the Interior and Safety recently reported that the number of births rose for a second consecutive year, reaching 260,000.

Still, it is far too early for complacency. The number of births remains roughly half of what it was a decade ago, and the fertility rate continues to rank among the lowest in the world. South Korea’s population has been shrinking for six consecutive years, while the pace of aging continues to accelerate. There are no signs that the low-fertility crisis has been resolved.

It is important to recognize that even this modest rebound reflects the cumulative impact of policies implemented under the first through fourth basic plans. As the saying goes, one must row harder when the tide comes in. With births rising slightly due to years of policy effort, the government should intensify its initiatives rather than ease off. Significant challenges remain, including improving work-life balance, expanding men’s participation in childcare, and recognizing diverse family structures. If policymakers relax their efforts simply because a few indicators have improved, South Korea risks repeating the familiar historical mistake of premature reassurance.