Lee proposes three-phase North Korea plan ahead of U.S. summit

In an interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun published on Aug. 21, President Lee Jae-myung outlined the new administration’s North Korea nuclear policy, saying, “Phase one is the freeze of nuclear weapons and missiles, phase two is reduction, and phase three is denuclearization.” He added, “While maintaining close coordination with the United States, we will actively pursue inter-Korean dialogue to create conditions for moving from a freeze to reduction and ultimately to complete denuclearization.”

This is the first time President Lee has mentioned a three-phase approach to North Korea’s nuclear issue. Attention now turns to whether this plan will be discussed at the South Korea-U.S. summit with President Donald Trump on Aug. 25. Lee’s denuclearization plan appears intended to lure North Korea, which has refused all dialogue, back to the negotiating table. Yet there are several points that warrant caution. The three-phase approach seems largely consistent with the Moon Jae-in administration’s nuclear policy, which viewed a freeze as the “entry point” to talks and complete dismantlement as the “exit.”

However, the new administration’s added “reduction” phase carries a significant risk of turning denuclearization talks into negotiations among nuclear-armed states, a scenario North Korea may seek. Although a reduction process is practically unavoidable between a freeze and complete dismantlement, officials have previously been reluctant to mention it for this reason.

The government is likely aware of these concerns. Still, it appears to view the reduction phase as an unavoidable incentive to persuade North Korea, which refuses any talks premised on denuclearization. The bigger challenge may arise after North Korea comes to the table under conditions where the denuclearization goal has already become blurred.

Denuclearization inevitably involves a long and arduous process, with verification, implementation, and simultaneous reciprocal measures demanded by North Korea at every step. If Seoul allows itself to be led from the outset, denuclearization could remain a distant and elusive goal while effectively accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

U.S. President Donald Trump has already referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” For political gain, he could agree to a “small deal” that lifts sanctions in exchange for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program, or limit the deal solely to dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, that threaten the U.S., without any roadmap or timeline for full denuclearization.

President Lee has pledged to exercise repeated patience until North Korea responds to South Korea’s efforts, but in reality, Seoul seems anxious about the possibility of direct North Korea-U.S. dealings that exclude it. While the plan is described as a “three-phase denuclearization,” it will be far more important at the Washington summit to discuss concrete measures to counter the North Korean nuclear threat than to focus on a framework that could be seen as abandoning denuclearization.