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Only a Prelude to “North Korea’s Doubtful Abandonment of Nuclear Weapons”

Only a Prelude to “North Korea’s Doubtful Abandonment of Nuclear Weapons”

Posted April. 14, 2007 07:56,   

한국어

Two months have passed since the Beijing Consensus was reached on February 13, a landmark event in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Experts on the Korean peninsula in the U.S. emphasized that the past sixty days have been, “a serious prelude to a difficult path to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, despite the ‘excellent framework’ known as the Beijing Consensus that has been in place.”

Dong-A Ilbo recently introduced the insight of Korean peninsular experts in Washington, including Larry Niksch, a specialist at the Congressional Research Service, and David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) (on page 4 of the April 13 edition). Following that, it conducted a telephone interview with Professor Emeritus Robert Scalapino of University of California at Berkeley, known as a prestigious expert on the Korean peninsula issues, Dr. Jonathan Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at Naval War College, and Bruce Cumings, distinguished professor at the University of Chicago.

Professor Scalapino answered the question, “What would be the lessons learned from the past 60 days?” saying, “I fully realize that in the long process of abolishing North Korean nuclear weapons, just making a first step toward commitment was arduous,” adding, “Participants of the six-party talks must have realized once again how complex the North’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons is.”

Professor Scalapino said, “I know from long years of experience that predicting North Korea’s behavior is not only extremely risky but foolish,” adding, “In the longer haul, we need to maintain our flexibility and stay bold with several basic principles.” He said, “There is no stepping back from full verification,” adding, “No external aid is to be provided, including energy aid (heavy oil of 50,000 tons) before the North shows some action first,” meaning that the North ought to keep its promises to ensure further progress at the talks.

Professor Scalapino explained, “The Bush administration was flexible enough, which is due to changes in personnel,” adding, “Hawks have left the government, and Condoleezza Rice has conquered the mind of President Bush as a realist.” He analyzed, “I believe North Korea has changed,” adding, “There was also strong pressure from China and from within the regime to negotiate [with the U.S. and others].”

Professor Pollack commented on the long-term prospects of the North Korean nuclear issue, saying, “There is, in effect, no possibility for North Korea to completely abandon its nuclear capability irreversibly within the next 10 years,” predicting, “The most feasible scenario is for the North to maintain its symbolic level of nuclear capability.” This means that the North will limit its nuclear activities in return for guarantees of safety from the international community, including the United States.

Professor Pollack said, “Achievements up until now have been merely oriented toward a prelude to an end of the nuclear program. Policymakers should make a balance between options and leverage by thoroughly weighing both.”

Last October, he said, quoting what he heard from Chinese officials, “North Korean diplomats said, ‘We are just doing what China did in the 1960s,’ and the Chinese officials rebutted this, saying, ‘Things are very much different in the 1960s and the 21st Century.’” He added, “The North, however, still feels that their situation is similar to that of China’s 40 years ago.” It means that the commonality is for isolated and financially-stricken national leaders tend to seek the same level of status enjoyed by enemy states by developing nuclear weapons.

Professor Cumings repeated, “Never late than never,” twice, evaluating, “I think the Bush administration is truly doing its best.”

Professor Cumings said, “The Bush administration is bending its principles [it used to put forward] in almost all fields,” adding, “In particular, it reversed some of its earlier comments, like, ‘There is no compensation for evil behavior,’ or the comment of ‘no dialogue with evil.’”

Professor Cumings said, “North Korea has acted the same way before. It is not a surprise if North Korea now pretends to show some development and delay to do so later by making various excuses.”



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