Analysis of President Kim`s U.S. visit

The summit talks between President Kim Dae-Jung and U.S. President George W. Bush produced a broad agreement on the continued pursuit by Seoul and Washington of an engagement policy with North Korea but at the same time revealed some rifts in terms of the perceptions of the communist state. The meeting posed a fresh challenge for the two sides in coordinating their policies. Preoccupation with their partnership in dealing with Pyongyang limited the scope of the bilateral meeting. The Seoul government was also seen to be wavering on the U.S. national missile defense system. The following discusses some of the key points that came out during the Washington talks and possible ways of resolving them. —Ed.

1. Clash of views on North Korea

The Kim-Bush meeting assured Seoul a leading role in setting North Korea policy; Seoul also was given the task of inducing substantive changes in North Korea to dispel American misgivings about the Pyongyang regime.

It has been repeatedly affirmed that relations between Washington and Pyongyang could not move ahead unless the latter took concrete steps to end its nuclear and missile development programs and curb its conventional forces and that these steps should also allow monitoring and verification.

As a way out, President Kim proposed the concept of comprehensive reciprocity and shared roles. Comprehensive reciprocity adds monitoring requirements to an earlier notion of flexible reciprocity and suggests that the United States concentrate on missiles and weapons of mass destruction as in the past, while South Korea should take care of conventional arms as they immediately affect the Korean Peninsula itself.

Since an overall framework is considered to have been set up during the summit, the Seoul government plans to convene an ROK-U.S. meeting of working-level officials to work out the details. Seoul believes it necessary to present its position and policy clearly before Washington comes up with its own specific approach to the North Korean question. Specialists see the need for South Korea to undertake a greater amount of persuasion directed at North Korea as well as the United States.

Through various channels of dialogue, Washington`s message calling for North Korea to show more concrete changes has to be relayed to North Korea, said Prof. Kim Sung-Han of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. Dankook University professor Jung Yong-Suk said South Korea should take into account the U.S. demand for concurrent pursuit of tension-reduction and exchange-cooperation.

2. Tricky question of peace treaty

President Kim`s statement that the subject of a peace agreement ought to be taken up at a four-way conference of the two Koreas, the U.S. and Japan may bode ill for future negotiations for a peace treaty between the two Koreas. Kim of course meant to reiterate his desire for quadripartite talks, but his remarks are likely to tie the hands of the two Koreas at a time when they are poised to seek a peace accord.

The four-nation meetings have stalled so far because they sought to adopt a 2+2 formula under which the two Koreas would lead negotiations for a peace agreement, which would be endorsed by the United States and China. South and North Korea were supposed to be the main players in the quest for a peace accord, yet North Korea tried to ignore the South as its chief interlocutor, instead seeking direct talks with the United States. This stood in the way of the four-way meeting.

Therefore, Kim`s call to place greater emphasis on the talks in arriving at a peace accord would probably reinforce, though indirectly, North Korea`s insistence on concluding such an agreement with the United States. For this reason, experts attache more importance to the expected second summit between the leaders of the two Koreas.

``Any four-party conferences are bound to get nowhere as long as the two Koreas remain at odds on the question of an inter-Korean peace treaty,`` Vice Unification Minister Jeong Se-Hyeon said. ``It is important to recognize the importance of having the second inter-Korean summit lay the groundwork for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to stimulate subsequent international discussions on the issue.``

His reasoning is that a framework for confidence-building and tension-reduction between the two Koreas, including a nonaggression pact, must be formulated at the forthcoming second summit in order to allow the two Koreas leeway to take a central role in any future four-way talks.``

3. Indecision on NMD

President Kim told Bush in Washington that Seoul did not side with Russia with regard to the missile defense (NMD) system promoted by the United States and that the reference to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty in the Kim-Putin statement made in Seoul should have been left out. The government claims to have borrowed a ``standard wording`` from widely accepted international phraseology concerning the ABM, and yet it had to reverse its earlier statement, apparently influenced by Washington`s unfavorable reaction. Such wavering and the undignified diplomatic gaffe was very embarrassing to Korea.

Some officials said the setbacks were inevitable in light of the reality of having to depend on U.S. help to secure peace here, but also expressed fear that Kim`s apologetic remarks could irritate other interested parties like Russia and China.

If the Russians issue a strong protest on the issue, Korea`s foreign relations would be disrupted and Seoul`s ties with the four powers surrounding Korea could face greater difficulties, an official said.

Prof. Yun Young-Kwan of Seoul National University said, ``The government needs to take seriously and learn a lesson from its failure to anticipate and provide for the implications of such sensitive issues as the NMD. It was too naive to think the NMD question would disappear if the question of North Korean missiles was resolved. We should develop our own logic and make our own preparations for dealing with the NMD, which is one of the centerpieces of the Bush administration`s policies.``

Ha Tae-Won scooop@donga.com