Illegal expansion, lax oversight cost lives again

The deadly fire at an auto parts factory in Daedeok District, Daejeon, was exacerbated by a combination of illegal expansion and poor management of combustible materials. Responsibility also lies with both central and local authorities, which left unlawful construction and lax oversight unaddressed for years at a facility where the risk of a large-scale disaster was well known.

Nine of the 14 victims were found in a break room the company had illegally built in 2015 between the second and third floors without filing the required report. The space was not included in official building plans, hindering firefighters as they tried to locate and access it during the blaze. With no proper ventilation and no designated evacuation routes, those inside had no viable means of escape.

Local governments are responsible for ordering the demolition of illegal structures and imposing penalties when such orders are ignored. Yet the Daejeon Metropolitan Government and the Daedeok District Office did not conduct a single on-site inspection for more than a decade and were apparently unaware of the unauthorized expansion.

Although a complaint filed through the government’s online civil petition system in August last year led to the discovery of illegal additions in the factory’s main building, the annex where the fire broke out was excluded from that inspection. Following the Itaewon crowd crush in 2022, the central government pledged immediate nationwide inspections of illegal structures and promised institutional reforms. No meaningful follow-up measures were taken.

Fire authorities believe the blaze, which began on the first floor, spread rapidly due to oil vapors and accumulated residues inside the factory. Fine oil particles suspended in the air or clinging to machinery and piping had already created conditions highly vulnerable to fire. Authorities were aware of these risks. After two fires broke out at the same factory within a month in 2023, officials conducted an investigation and pointed to oil-based substances and debris on floors and in dust collectors, issuing recommendations for improvement. However, they did not adequately verify whether those measures were implemented. Even the mandatory twice-yearly fire inspections were reduced to paperwork reviews submitted by the company, with no on-site confirmation.

The fire-prone nature of sandwich panel construction has been repeatedly highlighted, particularly after incidents such as the Aricell factory disaster two years ago. Each time, the government pledged corrective action, yet those promises failed to produce meaningful change. How many more lives must be lost before such negligence ends?