Prosecution reform must preserve checks and balances

Bills laying the legal groundwork for two new agencies, the Public Prosecution Service and the Serious Crimes Investigation Office, passed the National Assembly on March 20 and 22 under the leadership of the Democratic Party of Korea. The measures are tied to the planned abolition of the Prosecutors’ Office in October, marking a sweeping overhaul of the criminal justice system. As the principle of separating investigation and prosecution takes statutory form, the Prosecutors’ Office is set to disappear after 78 years. However, last-minute revisions driven by hard-line lawmakers within the ruling party have raised concerns that prosecutors’ ability to check investigative bodies has been weakened.

The legislation brings fundamental changes to the criminal justice framework. Prosecutors will lose the authority to initiate investigations and will instead focus on indictments and trial proceedings. The shift is designed to structurally prevent the recurrence of controversial practices such as politically motivated probes. The Serious Crimes Investigation Office, which will assume key investigative functions, will handle six categories of offenses, including corruption, economic crimes, insurrection and foreign exchange violations. It is also granted priority jurisdiction in cases where its mandate overlaps with that of the police or the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials.

Concerns have intensified as provisions intended to ensure oversight and coordination were removed during the legislative process. Hard-line members of the Democratic Party of Korea pushed to fully block prosecutorial involvement in investigations, leading to the deletion of several key safeguards. Earlier drafts required the Serious Crimes Investigation Office to notify the Public Prosecution Service when launching major investigations and allowed prosecutors to request case initiation when necessary. Those provisions were ultimately dropped. Clauses requiring mutual consultation and cooperation between investigators and prosecutors were also removed in their entirety.

The abolition of prosecutors’ authority to direct and supervise special judicial police officers has also drawn concern. Many officials in these roles, particularly in areas such as labor and public health, have limited experience, with 82 percent having less than three years in their posts. Some within the ranks say prosecutorial guidance remains necessary given the complexity of legal procedures. Without such oversight, there is a risk of procedural flaws that could undermine prosecutions, as well as the possibility of undue influence by agency heads or local government leaders over investigations.

Even with a separation of investigation and prosecution, the system must be structured to ensure coordination and mutual checks among institutions. Without such mechanisms, cases could be mishandled or lead to weak prosecutions, ultimately harming the public. Some hard-line lawmakers within the ruling party have called for the complete abolition of prosecutors’ authority to request supplementary investigations. Yet the legislative process has, in some respects, highlighted the continued need for such powers. In future deliberations on revising the Criminal Procedure Act, careful consideration will be required to minimize gaps in investigative oversight while upholding the broader principle of reform.