Global nuclear buildup threatens NPT review process

With six weeks remaining before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, held once every five years, the meeting is expected to convene under unusually heavy circumstances. The gathering, where countries pledge that nuclear-armed states will reduce their arsenals while nonnuclear states refrain from developing them, is widely viewed as a crucial test for the global nonproliferation regime. In diplomatic circles, some warn it could become the system’s final proving ground.

The 2015 NPT review conference ended without a final document because of disagreements over establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The 2022 conference, held two years late because of the COVID-19 pandemic, also failed to produce a final declaration amid the war in Ukraine. If this year’s meeting again concludes without results, concerns are growing that the international framework designed to prevent nuclear catastrophe could deteriorate into what critics describe as a “zombie treaty.”

Against this backdrop, countries around the world are intensifying competition in nuclear deterrence. The concept rests on the principle of mutually assured destruction, in which a nuclear attack by one side would trigger nuclear retaliation by the other. By harnessing the fear of nuclear weapons, the doctrine functions as both a psychological and military mechanism intended to discourage reckless aggression. Nuclear-armed states seek stronger deterrence by expanding their arsenals, while countries without nuclear weapons rely on extended deterrence under the nuclear umbrella of allied nations.

In the decades following the Cold War, calls to reduce nuclear arsenals gained some traction. As the international order increasingly shifts toward a self-help system, however, a pervasive fear has emerged that weakness invites aggression. Russia, a nuclear power, has repeatedly raised the prospect of using tactical nuclear weapons since invading Ukraine, openly wielding nuclear threats. North Korea and China have rapidly expanded their nuclear capabilities, while evidence has surfaced that Iran secretly stockpiled hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium beyond the scrutiny of the international community.

Debates over strengthening nuclear capabilities are also emerging among U.S. allies. French President Emmanuel Macron has openly signaled his intention to bolster France’s nuclear forces, saying the country has decided to increase its number of nuclear warheads, currently estimated at about 290. As nuclear powers expand their arsenals and alliance systems show signs of strain, even countries without nuclear weapons appear increasingly tempted to explore nuclear development.

Amid these shifts, the South Korean government, which has long advocated a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, faces growing strategic dilemmas. North Korea is openly pressing the United States to recognize it as a nuclear-armed state while accelerating the expansion of its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the strategic room for South Korea, which has long placed North Korea’s denuclearization at the top of its diplomatic agenda, is narrowing. Concerns that extended deterrence mechanisms such as the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group could weaken may further heighten public anxiety.

At a time when the race to strengthen nuclear capabilities is intensifying, the question is whether South Korea has developed a comprehensive grand plan for nuclear deterrence. While maintaining its commitment to denuclearization, an urgent task is to expand the peaceful use of nuclear energy permitted under the current NPT framework, including broader rights to uranium enrichment and reprocessing as well as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. Strengthening conventional military capabilities to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat also remains an essential priority. Rather than focusing primarily on promoting short-term defense export results, the government’s strategic control tower should concentrate on strengthening advanced military capabilities that complement U.S. extended deterrence.

At the same time, preparations are needed for the possibility of a domino effect in nuclear development while still upholding the principles of nonproliferation. Security cannot be secured simply by waiting and watching.