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Seoul presses Pyongyang talks amid U.S. uncertainty

Posted January. 16, 2026 08:55,   

Updated January. 16, 2026 08:55


Since the start of the new year, South Korea’s push to improve inter-Korean relations has given the impression that Seoul is acting largely on its own. The government appears to be accelerating its peace and coexistence strategy in an effort to seize a so-called golden window during the three months leading up to U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to China in April.

President Lee Jae-myung is seeking a visit to China in January and expects Beijing to play a role in encouraging change in North Korea ahead of April. Lee has made clear that the top priority of South Korea’s policy toward the North is to bring North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to the negotiating table, even if that means temporarily setting aside the issue of denuclearization. “Nothing can be achieved if we insist only on demands the other side cannot accept,” he said.

However, even during preparatory discussions, China reportedly indicated that it was not ready yet. The fact that the National Security Office chief mentioned the Korean Peninsula issue only briefly as the fifth and final item in his post-visit briefing suggests that the summit fell short of eliciting the proactive response from Beijing that Seoul had hoped for.

During the meeting, Lee proposed several "creative measures” through which China could play a mediating role in inter-Korean relations. The ideas included a railway project linking Seoul, Pyongyang and Beijing, as well as a trilateral tourism initiative centered on North Korea’s Wonsan-Kalma tourist zone. China’s response was again summed up as a need for more time, underscoring Beijing’s view that conditions must first be created and that North Korea itself must be willing to engage in dialogue.

To leverage Russia, currently the country closest to North Korea, the South Korean government is reviewing both the timing and approach for restoring South Korea-Russia relations. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine has made backchannel communication difficult. As South Korea’s defense exports to Europe become increasingly important, actively engaging Russia as a conduit to restart talks with North Korea remains a challenge. Japan, which underscores South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation while keeping its channel with North Korea open, appears to be in a stronger position than Seoul. Even so, it remains unclear how committed Tokyo is to influencing Pyongyang.

The most pressing concern is the markedly different sense of urgency between South Korea and the United States. Multiple South Korean officials said it is unclear whether the Trump administration, which Seoul hopes to support as a pacemaker, has a genuine willingness to engage North Korea or shares South Korea’s urgency on the issue.

Mentions of Kim Jong Un by President Trump have disappeared since his October visit to Gyeongju, and North Korea has been omitted from the U.S. National Security Strategy. The bilateral consultation framework intended to coordinate North Korea policy has been replaced by follow-up discussions based on fact sheets, with no updates since. The post of U.S. ambassador to South Korea, a key channel for communication, has also remained vacant for an extended period. Measures under consideration by Seoul, such as restoring the Sept. 19 inter-Korean military agreement or reducing or suspending joint military exercises in March, could trigger friction if they proceed without sufficient prior coordination with Washington.

A government official said there is a possibility President Trump could offer dialogue to North Korea ahead of the China trip, but it remains unclear whether South Korea and the United States share common goals on the timing and approach to engaging Pyongyang. “The pacemaker is standing still while only Seoul is running,” the official said. With North Korea deriding the government’s efforts as “petty requests” or “futile dreams,” Seoul may need to reconsider whether it is pushing the process alone.