South Korea eyes parliamentary reform after prosecutor abolition

The prosecution office, established in August 1948 with the founding of the South Korean government, will disappear after 78 years. In line with the Democratic Party’s pledge to inform citizens about prosecutorial reform before the Chuseok holiday, its abolition was fast-tracked according to the legislative schedule. Calls for extended debate were outweighed by party leaders’ push to punish abuses of prosecutorial power.

After completing prosecutorial reform, the Democratic Party now appears to be targeting the judiciary. Rep. Kim Byung-gi, the party’s floor leader, said at a 100-day press briefing that laws on judicial reform and curbing misinformation are expected to pass in November. Party leader Jeong Cheong-rae’s remarks about the Supreme Court chief suggest the party sees a hierarchy even among powers.

In a parliamentary speech, Jeong described the prosecution, courts, and media as institutions that have enjoyed unchecked power and said the three major reforms aim to restore abnormal practices and update the system for the times. While some question the political motives behind the reforms, many citizens support them.

Proponents often cite the will of the people. This raises a question: if public opinion is the standard, should parliamentary reform also be included as a “fourth reform” to restore unchecked power to normalcy?

Statistics Korea publishes annual “Social Indicators of Korea,” which include public trust in government institutions. In 2024, the National Assembly’s trust rating was just 26 percent, the lowest among state institutions, even below the abolished prosecution office at 43 percent. The courts scored 46.1 percent. The National Assembly also ranked last in 2023 and 2022.

The National Assembly has consistently ranked last since statistics were first compiled in 2013. Low public trust reflects resentment over excessive privileges, partisan battles serving only factional interests, and prioritizing party gains over public welfare.

Previous parliaments often emphasized “self-reform” at the start of new terms. The 20th National Assembly passed laws limiting lawmakers’ privileges, including automatic submission of arrest consent bills and banning the hiring of relatives as aides. The 21st National Assembly introduced continuous sessions and disclosed lawmakers’ attendance rates. All measures were enacted within a year of the term’s start.

Debates over their effectiveness and completeness continue, and the laws have not dramatically changed the National Assembly. Still, they signaled that lawmakers were responding to public opinion.

The ruling Democratic Party, committed to the three major reforms, pledged during the 22nd general elections to implement a “no work, no pay” rule for lawmakers, establish fines for disciplinary actions, and make the parliamentary Ethics Committee permanent. President Lee Jae-myung also proposed a citizen recall system for lawmakers during his presidential campaign.

Citizens are ready to back parliamentary reform, and relevant bills have already been introduced. If the ruling party advances parliamentary reform as swiftly as it did prosecutorial reform, doubts about the sincerity of the three major reforms could diminish.