Seoul urged to prepare Plan B for Pyongyang

“What is the government’s Plan B?”

This question reportedly came up during a recent policy briefing by the Ministry of Unification to the Presidential Policy Planning Committee. It reflected growing concern about how South Korea should respond if North Korea continues to ignore outreach efforts following Kim Jong Un’s declaration late last year that he now considers the South a “hostile foreign state.” The room grew silent.

Two of President Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea-related campaign pledges were fulfilled within his first week in office. Loudspeaker broadcasts toward the North were halted, and the government signaled a crackdown on civic groups launching anti-North Korean leaflets. Even officials in the defense and unification ministries described the pace as “unexpected.” Pyongyang responded the next day by ceasing its own cross-border noise broadcasts.

This question reportedly arose during a recent policy briefing by the Ministry of Unification to the Presidential Policy Planning Committee. It reflected growing concern over how South Korea should respond if North Korea continues to ignore outreach efforts after Kim Jong Un’s declaration late last year that he now considers the South a “hostile foreign state.” The room fell silent.

Conditions inside and outside North Korea do little to improve the outlook for inter-Korean relations. Domestically, Pyongyang is preparing for the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party in October and the Ninth Party Congress early next year. Externally, it has used the ongoing deadlock in the Ukraine war to strengthen its alliance with Russia, reportedly agreeing to send additional troops. Over the past two years, this growing partnership has expanded beyond military cooperation to include economic support such as food, raw materials, and refined oil. Kim’s confidence was clear in his October announcement of a “20x10” plan to build modern factories in 20 counties or cities annually for the next decade.

Reversing a two-year campaign of high-level disengagement with the South, which included abandoning the previous commitment to unification, would require significant justification to the North Korean public. Some analysts believe Kim now finds himself in the most favorable strategic position since taking power, with Russian backing and repeated dialogue overtures from Seoul and Washington. For that reason, it may be unrealistic to expect a repeat of 2018, when a single New Year’s speech by Kim triggered a dramatic turnaround in inter-Korean relations.

Without a clear Plan B, excessive reliance on reciprocity could turn inter-Korean policy into a political liability. The Moon Jae-in administration, which clung to its peace initiative even after the 2019 North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi collapsed, was dogged by criticism of being overly deferential to Pyongyang. That failure likely taught Kim a lesson. Even if he resumes dialogue with Donald Trump, he may choose to exclude South Korea from the process.

While the decision to halt loudspeaker broadcasts may have been unavoidable to relieve border-area residents, what comes next is more consequential. If the Lee administration genuinely aims to establish lasting peace and achieve denuclearization, it must carefully time and calibrate its next move, such as the potential restoration of the Sept. 19 inter-Korean military agreement. By then, the government must also be able to answer one question with clarity: What is Plan B?