Birthrate rebound will fade unless youth anxiety eases

In January, 23,947 babies were born in South Korea—a rise of 11.6% compared to the same month last year. It marked the first increase in January births in a decade, dating back to 2015. Following a slight rebound in the total fertility rate (TFR), hopes have been rising that the upward birth trend could continue for a while. The average number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime was 0.75 last year,

The government, which declared a “population emergency” last June and has since poured resources into boosting the birthrate, has expressed satisfaction quickly. Some officials have even described the recent uptick as a “historic achievement.”

There is no need to diminish the government's efforts. Yet it is far too early to celebrate. Many experts attribute the rebound to demographic and pandemic-related base effects. Members of the so-called "echo boom" generation—those born between 1991 and 1996, when birthrates temporarily surged—are now reaching peak marriage and childbearing age. Meanwhile, the number of marriages declined during the COVID-19 pandemic and has recently rebounded, naturally leading to more births.

However, once these temporary effects subside, the birthrate could quickly fall again. To prevent another slide, it is crucial to revisit the underlying causes of the last decade-long “birth strike” among young people.

Looking back to a little more than a decade ago, South Korea’s TFR began to decline in 2016 (from 1.17). This was when negative sentiment toward marriage and childbirth grew significantly among younger generations. At the time, those in their 20s and 30s were gripped by anxiety and a deep mistrust in government. The 2014 Sewol ferry disaster intensified the belief that the state could not protect its people. The term “Hell Joseon” gained popularity to describe a nation seen as hopeless. A sense of despair took hold, with the younger generation resigning themselves to the idea that effort would not change their fate—social status seemed preordained by one’s parents’ wealth, as captured in the “spoon class theory” that labeled people gold or dirt spoons.

Since then, things have not improved. Housing prices skyrocketed due to failed real estate policies, exacerbating feelings of hopelessness among the youth. As a result, many chose to remain single and child-free, favoring DINK (dual income, no kids) lifestyles over traditional family formation. During this period, the TFR plummeted from 1.24 in 2015 to 0.92 in 2019—what some now call “the lost five years” that cemented South Korea’s ultra-low birthrate. Kim Yeong-mi, former vice chair of the Presidential Committee on Aging Society and Population Policy, described this as the most critical period in analyzing the country's fertility decline. “The entire country was sending signals to young people not to have children,” she said.