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[Editorial] Defense and economic talks' future agenda

Posted September. 26, 2000 20:53,   

한국어

The meetings between the South and the North from Sept. 25 to 26 for the defense ministers' talks in Jeju and for consultations on mutual economic cooperation in Seoul appear to be a meaningful step, although they fell short of meeting our expectations.

The inter-Korean defense ministers' talks, in particular, made an important start with both sides agreeing to make common efforts to lessen military tension and for the realization of lasting peace on the peninsula. The defense talks' 5-item joint statement released for the press, made it clear in Article 1 that they agreed to render full cooperation for the resolution of any military issues that may arise in the course of implementing the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration. This statement of military support for the implementation of the Joint Declaration is surely a clear indication for the easing of tensions on the peninsula, although in a somewhat indirect way as stated in Article 1.

But, Article 1 of the joint statement was reinforced by Article 2, which makes direct references to the fact that both military authorities recognize peace and the easing of tensions, as well as the removal of the danger of war on the peninsula, are very important.

Article 4 states that the issues of mutual jurisdiction over the areas of the Demilitarized Military Zone (DMZ) for the Gyeongui railway links and road will be settled according to what is stated in the Korean Armistice Agreement. This will establish the first precedent that both Koreas directly control, after mutual consultations, some of the DMZ areas, which have so far been controlled by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).

Overall, the inter-Korean defense ministers' meeting, the first ever since the division, has rendered some productive results. But, the talks were not without some disappointing aspects too. The joint statements failed to mention altogether some of the fundamental pending issues or made rather evasive and abstract references to them.

First, the joint statement must have addressed some agendas for the building of mutual confidence as a first step toward the easing of tension. The statement should have mentioned, for example, the installment of direct hot lines between both sides' top military commanders as well as the mutual exchange of inspection teams over, and prior advice of, military exercises.

Second, we have also some reservations about the way the statements tried to avoid mentioning the ``the working-level military committee,'' despite the fact that they agreed to have working-level military officers deal with the specific matters arising from the railway link and road constructions. From this, we can't avoid receiving the impression that the North is somewhat reluctant about the institutionalization of such inter-Korean military contacts, which are a desired step to establish lasting and routine channels of inter-Korean dialogue and consultations.

The Kim administration should make adequate preparations for the forthcoming second defense ministers' meeting in view of some critical views that the outcome of the Jeju defense talks reflected by and large the North's stance. We hope that the second defense ministerial talks scheduled in November in the North will be able to produce a breakthrough in making the steps to establish the defense meeting as a routine affair as well as establishing concrete measures for peace negotiations.