A stronger Japan and lingering regional concerns

On the evening of May 4, I visited Urban Dock LaLaport Toyosu, a sprawling waterfront shopping complex in Tokyo’s Koto Ward. Tokyo Bay stretched out before me, while the lights of nearby high-rise apartments shimmered across the water, creating one of the city’s most striking nighttime views.

Three decades ago, however, the scene was very different. The site was home to a shipyard operated by IHI, formerly Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, one of Japan’s three leading heavy-industry companies. The facility built not only giant commercial vessels but also warships for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Its final project was the destroyer Akebono in 2000, after which the shipyard shut down.

Japan was once the undisputed leader in global shipbuilding, producing roughly half of the world’s ships through the 1980s. Today, it trails South Korea and China, both relative latecomers to the industry. In recent months, Japanese media outlets, including the Nikkei, have revisited the story of the former shipyard, now transformed into a bustling shopping destination.

The renewed attention is no coincidence. Few places better symbolize the rise and decline of Japan’s industrial might. Yet just six months after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office, a different narrative appears to be taking shape.

Last month, Takaichi’s government approved a Cabinet decision effectively permitting exports of lethal weapons. The move marked a major departure from Japan’s long-standing postwar policy of prohibiting such exports. The government is also accelerating efforts to revise the Constitution. Debate has expanded beyond formally recognizing the Self-Defense Forces, with growing calls to redefine them as a national defense force.

Japan’s security posture has already undergone significant change. In 2022, revisions to the country’s three key security documents formally embraced the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, including the ability to strike enemy bases. In March, Japan deployed long-range missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers, placing virtually the entire Korean Peninsula within reach.

Some analysts argue that the principle of exclusively defensive defense, long regarded as the cornerstone of Japan’s postwar security doctrine, now survives largely in name.

Concerns that Japan could once again emerge as a major military power have surfaced repeatedly since its postwar economic resurgence. Yet Tokyo has at times exercised restraint, mindful of domestic opinion and the sensitivities of neighboring countries. One notable example came in 1976, when Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s administration effectively imposed a blanket ban on arms exports and pledged to cap defense spending at 1% of gross national product. Today, such commitments are rarely mentioned in Japan’s political discourse.

Takaichi won a landslide victory in February’s general election under the slogan “A Strong and Prosperous Japan.” As rising prices continue to squeeze household finances, critics have questioned whether the promised prosperity has materialized, arguing that strength has become far more visible than economic well-being. Even so, the prime minister continues to enjoy approval ratings of around 60%.

A stronger Japan could also serve South Korea’s interests. Closer cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan would strengthen efforts to deter the military ambitions of North Korea, China and Russia. At the same time, unresolved historical grievances make it difficult for many in the region to view Japan’s expanding military role without unease.

On May 19 and 20, the leaders of South Korea and Japan met in Andong, North Gyeongsang Province, where they agreed to expand cooperation in areas including energy. The summit offered another sign that bilateral ties continue to deepen through the framework of shuttle diplomacy.

The origins of shuttle diplomacy trace back to the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration. President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi pledged to institutionalize regular summits and close consultation between the two countries, a commitment they subsequently honored through sustained engagement.

The declaration will mark its 30th anniversary in two years. President Lee Jae-myung will still be in office, and Takaichi is also likely to remain in power. Rather than merely preserving the tradition of shuttle diplomacy, the two leaders have an opportunity to articulate a broader vision for the next chapter of South Korea-Japan relations, one grounded in peace, coexistence and a shared future.

If they can seize that opportunity, concerns over a stronger Japan may gradually become easier to overcome.