Pyongyang's wedge strategy targets Seoul, Washington

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has formally entrenched his “two hostile states” doctrine, officially designating South Korea as an enemy. In a report to the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress carried by state media on Feb. 26, Kim described South Korea as a “permanent enemy” and vowed to exclude it indefinitely from the category of compatriots. At the same time, he offered a cautious opening to the United States, saying there would be “no reason not to get along” if Washington recognizes North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and ends what Pyongyang calls its hostile policy. His remarks effectively set out conditions for a potential North Korea-U.S. summit ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to China in late March.

Kim’s speech underscores that Pyongyang has no intention of softening its hard-line stance toward Seoul, despite a series of confidence-building measures by the South Korean government aimed at improving inter-Korean ties. He first introduced the “two hostile states” concept in 2023, but this time he formally cemented it at the party congress, the regime’s top decision-making body that sets North Korea’s strategic direction every five years. Kim also criticized Seoul’s conciliatory efforts as a “deceptive charade” and warned of South Korea’s “complete destruction,” an implicit reference to the threat of a nuclear strike.

While leaving the door open for dialogue with Washington, Kim reiterated that the United States must first recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. He expressed a similar position in a speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly in September last year. A month later, during a visit to South Korea, President Trump proposed a North Korea-U.S. summit, but Pyongyang did not respond. Kim’s latest remarks can be seen as renewed pressure on Trump, who has consistently signaled interest in meeting him, to grant recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status as a precondition for talks. Preventing Trump, who has at times referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power,” from being drawn into such a framework has become a pressing task for Seoul.

The most effective way to counter Pyongyang’s attempts to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington while seeking direct engagement with the United States is to maintain an unbroken South Korea-U.S. alliance. Yet recent frictions over joint military exercises, along with visible divisions within the South Korean government between officials prioritizing engagement with the North and those emphasizing the alliance, threaten that unity. A bilateral consultative body on North Korea policy, launched by the Foreign Ministry, has remained inactive since its first meeting in December last year due to opposition from the Unification Ministry. The presidential National Security Office should now move quickly to coordinate North Korea policy in close detail with the White House. Only by doing so can Seoul reduce the risk of an impulsive nuclear bargain between Washington and Pyongyang.