Unification Minister Chung Dong-young has stirred controversy with a string of muddled statements on North Korea policy. In Berlin on Sept. 29, while attending an international forum, he said North Korea has become one of three nations capable of striking the U.S. mainland. The comment effectively treated Pyongyang as a nuclear-armed state alongside China and Russia, with both warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
His view conflicted with remarks President Lee Jae-myung made five days earlier in New York, where Lee said reentry technology was the only remaining hurdle for North Korean ICBMs. That capability, withstanding extreme heat and shock on reentry, is the final step to a complete ICBM. Gen. Jin Young-seung, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also said recently that the North has not proven reentry. Yet the minister responsible for North Korea policy spoke as if Pyongyang had already finished the job, leaving the public understandably confused.
Chung also argued that because North Korea calls itself a “strategic state,” policy should begin from the reality of its changed status. In North Korean usage, the term signals a self-claimed nuclear power. His stance sounded like a call to negotiate after recognizing the North’s nuclear status, at odds with the government’s denuclearization goal and its policy that nuclear possession is unacceptable.
His recently floated idea of “peaceful two states” has generated further discord inside the government. The notion of recognizing North Korea as a separate country runs counter to the Constitution, which defines the national territory as the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands and declares unification a national objective. National Security Adviser Wi Seong-rak said the government does not accept a two-state formula, but Chung has not withdrawn his position.
Less than a month remains before the APEC summit in Gyeongju, where tough diplomacy with the United States, China and Japan over the North Korean nuclear issue is expected. A fresh U.S.–North Korea dialogue is also possible. If internal mixed messages continue, even Washington could question Seoul’s commitment to denuclearization. In such conditions, any U.S.–North Korea talks risk deeper disagreement over how to resolve the nuclear problem.
At home, North Korea policy is sharply divisive, which makes public support essential. The government must speak with one voice to earn that support. The minister overseeing North Korea policy should not undermine that principle with careless remarks.
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