“Recent displays of friendliness by Modi, Xi and Putin show that the United States could push India into the camp of its adversaries, China and Russia.”
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and former White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan wrote this in a Sept. 4 column for Foreign Affairs. They highlighted the cordial interactions among the leaders of China, Russia and India at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit held Sept. 1 in Tianjin, China, expressing concern. Major international media also interpreted the scene as a symbolic moment of anti-American solidarity in response to the Trump administration’s tariff pressure.
It was the U.S. tariff assault that prompted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who had famously shared a bromance with U.S. President Donald Trump, to visit Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on his own initiative. Previously, the Trump administration imposed high tariffs of up to 50 percent on Indian imports of Russian crude oil. But India, the world’s most populous nation and a self-proclaimed leader of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, chose sovereignty over submission. India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated, “India has the sovereign right to make decisions based on economic necessity,” rejecting U.S. demands.
Former U.S. administrations had consistently sought to bring India closer to counter China. A notable example is the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement pursued during the Bush administration. India, which has experienced armed clashes with China along their border since 1962, also joined the U.S.-led security framework Quad in 2007 to participate in efforts to check China’s influence. However, Trump’s “America First” diplomacy is now shaking one pillar of the Quad.
The internal divisions do not stop there. Even AUKUS, the U.S.-U.K.-Australia security pact, which offers a stronger military tool to counter China than the Quad, faces uncertainty. Elbridge Colby, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, said at an event last year, “U.S. nuclear submarines are extremely important assets. Why would we give these ‘crown jewels’ to Australia at a time we need them most?” Earlier, the Biden administration had agreed under AUKUS to sell three nuclear submarines to Australia by 2032. The aim was to block Chinese naval expansion in the Pacific by providing strategic nuclear assets to Australia. However, concerns over insufficient nuclear submarine production have prompted the U.S. Department of Defense to review the AUKUS agreement.
Australia was alarmed by the shift in U.S. policy. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull criticized it, saying, “We are spending $3 billion, but there is no guarantee we will actually receive the nuclear submarines. AUKUS is a terrible and unfair deal for Australia.”
In this way, the Trump administration’s America First diplomacy is opening a “window of opportunity” for China by causing rifts among U.S. allies. South Korea, facing $350 billion in U.S. investment pressure, is no exception. China is seeking to exploit cracks in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. On Sept. 17, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun that “in a situation of widespread unilateral coercion, the two countries must jointly oppose trade protectionism,” reflecting a similar approach.
The key point is that in the context of North Korea’s nuclear threat and growing alignment among North Korea, China and Russia, the value of the South Korea-U.S. alliance is immense. While South Korea must respond firmly to unreasonable U.S. trade demands, it must also carefully strengthen trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
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