Special envoy diplomacy raises questions over effectiveness

Early last month, the South Korean government broke with tradition by announcing it would send presidential envoys not only to the four major powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—but to 14 countries in total. The initiative aimed to signal the return of a “democratic Republic of Korea” to the international stage and to present the new administration’s policy agenda. So far, envoys have been named for 11 countries, and 10 delegations have completed their assignments.

The departure from tradition has raised questions about whether the move reflects a truly pragmatic, interest-based diplomacy. Only four heads of state—from the European Union, India, Vietnam, and Malaysia—received letters personally signed by President Lee. In six other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, Canada, and Australia, the envoys were received by ministers rather than top leaders.

Although past envoys have not always met with heads of state, the rank of the recipient carries weight, especially considering the mission’s stated purpose. A presidential letter offers a rare chance not only to convey the leader’s message but also to hear, firsthand, the foreign counterpart’s views on South Korea. Such insight is difficult to obtain through regular diplomatic channels. Critics say that special envoy diplomacy is effectively part of summit-level engagement, and when envoys fail to meet top leaders, the mission loses much of its significance.

A working-level official involved in the envoy program described the current situation as “globally unusual,” citing difficulties in coordinating visits amid a global climate shaped by U.S.-driven trade tensions and overlapping crises.

Despite the challenges, critics say the government appears to be giving little importance to this round of special envoy diplomacy. Unlike in previous cases, there have been no reports of President Lee meeting with envoys before their departure or receiving briefings after their return.

Skepticism about the sincerity of the initiative has grown, with critics pointing to the envoy selection as a form of political reward after the presidential election. Of the 33 envoys announced so far, 32 have close ties to the ruling party, and nine served as senior campaign officials. The appointments have been unfavorably compared to those under the Moon Jae-in administration, which included a broader mix of business leaders and foreign policy specialists.

Concerns have grown further due to the lack of progress on envoy missions to key nations such as the United States, China, and Japan. Delegations have yet to be finalized for China and Japan. In the case of the United States, more than two weeks have passed since the envoy list was announced, but no departure date has been set. Efforts to arrange meetings with high-ranking officials, including U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, have reportedly faced setbacks. One diplomatic source said that if an envoy to a key ally cannot even meet with a cabinet-level official, it could amount to a diplomatic failure.

Amid growing uncertainty in the South Korea-U.S. relationship, including unresolved tariff negotiations and possible restructuring of U.S. Forces Korea under the concept of strategic flexibility, doubts are rising over whether the special envoys can meaningfully serve the national interest. Some critics argue that appointing ambassadors to key countries should take precedence.

If the Lee administration’s special envoy diplomacy, launched with the stated goal of restoring South Korea to normalcy on the global stage, is to avoid ending in anticlimax, it must change course. So far, this effort at interest-centered pragmatism appears to have done more harm than good.