N. Korean military’s movements around the 38th parallel

The situation in the north of the 38th parallel took a sudden turn on June 17, 1950. North Korea, which had previously maintained only guard and security forces along the 38th parallel, swiftly deployed eight divisions from Hamgyong Province and Pyongan Province to the area. By June 21, the redeployment was complete, with operation orders and the timing of the invasion delivered to officers.

While the army remained silent, it couldn’t keep the secret. A few members of the North Korean army deserted to share the information about the invasion when their troops were deployed to the 38th parallel. The South Korean army’s intelligence command determined that North Korea was planning to invade the South on June 24 and reported it to Chief of Staff Chae Byong-duk. At the same time, the cancelation of emergency stand-by, which was placed on June 24, and the cancelation of the order on leave to go or sleep out of the barracks for the entire army were proposed.

Chae refused the proposal and deployed a special team to observe the enemy’s movements and report by 8 a.m. on June 25. Warnings about North Korea’s invasion of the South had already been made at that point—in March and May. As a result, the South Korean army had reached its limit, as emergency stand-by was continuously issued for the entire army. Chae found this worrisome.

Chae’s concerns are understandable. But there was a fundamental problem. Most North Korean army was far from the 38th parallel in March and May. It must have been the priority to build a system to detect signs of invasion, such as the North Korean army’s redeployment. It wasn’t a difficult thing to do at the time.

Regrettably, the South Korean army was ill-prepared for an all-out war. The U.S. declined to provide support, the South Korean government was financially constrained, and its National Assembly was preoccupied with political matters. The soldiers, caught in the middle, were subjected to the consequences of these circumstances. They were denied the flexibility to leave or sleep out of the barracks, a measure that could have eased their situation. Instead, they were pushed as if they were in wartime, a response that was more for show than for practical benefits.

The personnel and other policies of the Army Headquarters were going in the opposite direction of preparing for a war. In April, division commanders of the entire army were replaced at once. There was no consistency in thought or action, and political logic was at play. Something like this should never happen again.