U.S. Official Advises, “Do Not Push Ahead with Aid to North Korea”

“We just entered into a long and tedious process. I hope the Korean government does not separate its support of North Korea from the nuclear issue in its optimism and enthusiasm.” In an interview with the Dong-A Ilbo on February 26, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) senior advisor Robert Einhorn, who led the Clinton administration’s negotiations with North Korea as assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Department of State, advised that Korea and the U.S. should not lose patience and stay cool-headed in order to make progress based on the Beijing disarmament agreement reached on February 13.

Interviewer: What do you think of the prospects of the Beijing agreement?

Einhorn: “The Beijing agreement was a positive first step. However, implementing it won’t be easy. The best situation will be that North Korea implements at least the agreed-upon minimum requirements. In the second stage, North Korea should declare its nuclear program completely and accurately, but presumably what they report will not be appropriate from the perspective of the U.S. For example, North Korea is not likely to make an honest report about the key issue of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Let’s suppose that North Korea said, “We tried to build a plant for HEU but gave up after several failed attempts. We abandoned all the imported equipment.” The U.S. needs evidence to say, “It’s not quite credible.” Where can we find the documents needed to confirm that they were really disabled? North Korea might have a completely different idea of what it means to disable nuclear facilities.”

Interviewer: Will the Bush administration’s attitude change?

Einhorn: “We don’t know how much patience the Bush administration will show in making compromises. The administration is still split. The Beijing agreement is worth the cost that it takes to implement, and the first support of 50,000t of energy does not come from revenues. Still, some Republicans are criticizing the deal. Therefore, the situation will worsen.”

Einhorn emphasized, “The process will be long and tedious. It will be a very slow, painful, agonizing and disparaging process, which is likely to be the best that can be anticipated.”

“According to my experience, we should continue to pressure North Korea in negotiations. Nothing comes easily. Enduring with patience, we should make North Korea realize that it cannot but pay for it if it doesn’t cooperate,” added Einhorn.

Interviewer: Inter-Korean ministerial level talks were held in Pyongyang today seven months after the last one.

Einhorn: “I understand and support South Korea’s effort to cooperate with North Korea, but any reconciliation should be made in correspondence to the progress made in the six-way talks on the North Korean nuclear issue to help the Korean Peninsula become denuclearized. There is a danger that the Roh administration may separate the two Koreas’ cooperation issue from the nuclear issue in its enthusiastic optimism about the result of six-way talks. North Korea may take President Roh’s and the unification minister’s statements made after the Beijing agreement as a signal that South Korea will separate the two issues. If South Korea shows signs of its unconditional aid to North Korea, it is hard to make North Korea more active in making negotiations. It is important for South Korea to set its aid efforts in accordance with the substantial and verifiable progress made in negotiations.”

Interviewer: President Roh said, “It is a profitable business no matter how much we are now investing.”

Einhorn: “I think it is wrong to pretend that supporting North Korea will be profitable although there is no progress in dismantling its nuclear program.”

Interviewer: What do you think of the transfer of wartime operational control of Korea’s armed forces agreed upon by the South Korean defense minister and U.S. defense secretary?

Einhorn: “It was a good decision to push the deadline as far back as possible in the given time period between 2009 and 2012. It is true that there should be a deadline. However, South Korea should be ready to take on additional defense responsibility when it takes back wartime control. If there is a plan for delaying the transfer while watching how the denuclearization will turn out, I would prefer it. I understand why some argue that South Korea’s readiness be considered along with the North Korean nuclear issue. I hope that the transfer, scheduled to be finished by 2012, will be made flexibly in consideration of the two factors— the North’s nuclear issue and the South’s readiness.”

sechepa@donga.com