[Editorial] Dispatch Needs Rational Recognition of Reality

Despite the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between Korea and the U.S., the problem of sending troops to Iraq has not been sorted out yet. The scale, type, and location of the troop dispatch have not been decided upon, but people have accepted the remarks of Donald Rumsfeld even though it seems that the quagmire is tangled up more than before.

As I have continuously emphasized, the government needs to solve this problem from the viewpoint of securing the Korea-U.S. alliance. If we send 3,000 of our troops to Iraq, it would be the third biggest number among the alliances after the U.S., and U.K. Considering the reality in Iraq, which has steadily gotten worse as the days roll by, with threats of the terrorists such as Al Qaeda – the decision would be hard to set. Negative public opinion against sending combat forces has also been stirred up; it will not be an easy task to face.

In the middle of these difficult circumstances, the government has to pick out the card of dispatch to Iraq according to the Korea-U.S. alliance. Right now, the government has to persuade the U.S. It would be fair and square as the sovereign country tries to do its best in persuading its counterpart, once its decision has been made.

We have to think about the background of the U.S., who has not been happily receiving our suggestions. It has been heard that the U.S. foreign security related officers had asserted, “Do not ask Korea to send their troops to Iraq.” The conflicts between the presidential aides, our wishy-washy attitudes around the scale of military contingent to Iraq, and the disruption from the public‘s opinion might have affected the U.S. to develop skepticism on its closest alliance, Korea. Since the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was supposed to take charge of preparing the following measures, further conflicts should not be stirred up inside the government.

Once we have made our decision to dispatch armed forces to Iraq, there should not be any discordance in negotiation with the U.S., which could send the relationship into a much worse predicament than it is now. In order to reach a conclusion that can please both sides at the same time, it is necessary to take the special situation of the Korean peninsula into account. If the ratio of combat forces and supply units reflects as an obstacle, we can patch it up, considering the circumstances of the U.S. – who is aware with the reality in Iraq more than any other countries.

The troop dispatch problem has to be wrapped up in a way that can contribute to the Korea-U.S. alliance. In such a viewpoint, the behaviors of some people who are unconditionally opposed to the troop dispatch would not be helpful to everyone’s interests. It would be very difficult to stick to national interests, once the opinion of the government and the people grows apart.