For whom was the investigative authority transferred?

The National Intelligence Service (NIS) has fully transferred its anti-communist investigation authority to the police, effective since yesterday. Consequently, the NIS can no longer conduct investigations into espionage cases. This includes limitations on forced investigations, such as search and seizure, and the NIS is now ineligible to apply for an arrest warrant.

With the transfer of anti-communist investigative authority, the police have immediately assumed responsibility for cases involving violations of the National Security Act by executive members of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union and the Korean Peasants League, which were previously under the NIS. Espionage investigations typically require years to accumulate intelligence. An intelligence official noted, "In the case of the Cheongju Spy Group case, internal investigation data was dating back to 1998." This espionage case, involving a subversive group carrying out acts against security under North Korean agents' orders, took over 20 years from intelligence collection to investigation. The official emphasized “the need for patience and caution in piecing together such cases,” raising questions about whether the police can match the persistence required.

Certainly, spy investigations are not exclusive to the NIS; they don't hold a natural right over such matters. If the police can perform these investigations more effectively than the NIS, it is appropriate for the police to take on these responsibilities.

The effectiveness of the police in spy investigations depends on their competency. The police have stated their intention to increase the number of security investigation personnel from 724 last year to 1,127 this year. However, when considering only pure anti-communist investigative personnel, this number significantly decreases to about 750 individuals. The police's self-assessment indicates that, when accounting for personnel capable of independent anti-communist investigation, the number drops to 142. A former NIS anti-communist investigation agent expressed concern, stating, "For every 1 won North Korea spends on spying against South Korea, South Korea has to invest 100 won to catch them." This implies that the investigation becomes highly challenging and labor-intensive, with security agents tracking the movements of a spy, occasionally sharing the same PC room, and even staying in the same lodgings as the spy, all falling within the scope of anti-communist investigation. The former agent is apprehensive that having fewer than 200 key personnel in an anti-communist investigation may "give a playground to spies."

Insufficient human resources pose a challenge, but an even more significant issue is the lack of experience. It has been revealed that over half of the police officers leading espionage investigations from this year have less than three years of security investigation experience. Furthermore, the National Security Investigation Director, who heads the police security investigation team, has zero experience in anti-communist investigations.

Another issue is the apparent lack of enthusiasm within the police to excel in their new responsibilities. Despite National Police Agency Commissioner Yoon Hee-geun expressing his commitment to "fundamentally reform the police's security investigation capabilities" in his New Year's address, there are voices within the police suggesting that achieving this goal will not be easy. "There are many voices within the police who are not very happy about assuming responsibility for anti-communist investigations," a high-ranking police official mentioned.

In reality, it is not a new phenomenon that security police, specializing in anti-communist investigations, are often considered outcasts within the police organization. The nature of espionage investigations, which can extend for 10 years or more, naturally makes security police positions less desirable due to the challenges in building performance and securing promotions. Last month, a high-ranking police officer noted that there were no security police officers on the list of candidates for promotion to police inspectors.

Gaps in the espionage investigation process pose a risk to national security. If the police are to assume responsibility for espionage investigations, they must do so thoroughly with a well-defined plan and determination. Additionally, the NIS should actively cooperate with the police within the legal framework rather than express concerns behind the scenes. If both the police and the NIS lack confidence in this approach, consideration could be given to establishing a dedicated National Security Investigation Office or reverting to the previous system.