The naval clash in the West Sea in Jun 29, triggered a controversy over the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung (DJ) administration.
It is so natural that the public has become enraged at the unexpected incident, which claimed 20 casualties. Even worse, the armed conflict was provoked by the North Korean region, which has been regarded as the partner for a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Thus it is also natural that the Sunshine policy, which has been the basic pillar of the Kim administration`s North Korea policy.
As most of other debates have been so far, the debate over the Sunshine Policy is also intensifying the internal feud. For we are too much focused on rights and wrongs rather than exploring ways to extract a formal apology from North Korea or working out countermeasures to cope with the situation through a rational discussion.
There is one thing we, whether supporters or opponents, should not forget in order to bring the Sunshine Policy up for a desirable discussion. That is, South Korea`s stance for co-existence with North Korea has been maintained since the early 1970s, and that for cooperation with the North based on economic assistance since the 1980s.
The reconciliatory and cooperative policy toward North Korea, which has been called the `engagement policy` or the `Sunshine Policy` since the inauguration of the incumbent government, goes way back to the `Declaration for Peaceful Reunification` issued by then president Park Jeong-Hee in Aug. 1970 and the `July 4 Joint Statement of South and North Korea in 1972. The Jeon Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo regimes promoted more aggressive approach to North Korea, witnessing significant progress including the inter-Korean Economic Summit in 1984, the enactment of the South-North exchange and cooperation law in 1990, and the concluding of the historic Basic Agreement in 1991.
The Kim Yeong-Sam administration was actively engaged in the engagement policy toward North Korea. The administration went so far as to send Mr. Lee In-mo, who had long refused to live in a democratic society, back to North Korea despite vehement opposition from the public. In a sweet reward, Kim Yeongsam finally reached an agreement with the late North Korean dictator, Kim Il-sung, to hold a summit only to no avail because of his sudden death.
All these were policies to induce changes in the North Korean regime through contact and assistance. These policies can also be said sunshine policy.
The term, `sunshine policy` has long been used with the `big brother theory`. In Oct. 1995, when Kim Yeong-Sam took the helm of the nation, North Korean spies appeared in Buyeo, South Chungcheong province. A local newspaper, which is now a great supporter for President Kim Dae-Jung`s Sunshine Policy, wrote in its editorial, "The appearance of the spies clearly showed how innocent we are in promoting engagement policies toward the Communist state called `sunshine` or `big brother` policies."
These facts indicate that the `sunshine policy` is not DJ`S invention nor his patented product, and that his predecessors excluding the Lee Seung-Man regime did not insist on a `one-way` policy. The problem is the principle and methodology of DJ`s Sunshine Policy, and not the Sunshine Policy itself. The center of the problem lies whether DJ`s Sunshine Policy obtained a firm security posture while achieving its ultimate goal of inducing changes in North Korea and improving the inter-Korean relations.
We are not certain whether the North premeditated the recent naval clash in the West Sea or it had another intention. But no matter what the North`s intention is, the clash clearly showed the limitation and problems of the Sunshine Policy, which has kept making concessions to the North in order to induce changes in the North Korean regime. The government and its supporters should not mislead the public.
DJ`s Sunshine Policy has merits and demerits like any other policies. If its merits are personnel exchanges and improvement in mutual understanding, the demerits are the government`s arbitrary attitude blaming opponents as an `anti-unification force` rather that promoting bipartisan agreement in implementing the North Korea policy. The government has lost its flexibility and resilience in promoting the policy.
This is mainly attributed to the bigotry and rigidity of the Kim Dae-jung administration, which scrambled to hold the inter-Korean summit. We only got a gun fire from the North in return for our economic aid. We can also witness the inconsistency of the government policy when it has suspended economic aid for starving North Korean people, and on the other hand it has give the Mt. Geumgan tour project green light.
It is evident that the recent naval skirmish in the West Sea was intended by the North Korean military. But the government says that it is `unclear` whether the North`s leadership including Kim Jong-Il got involved in the incident. But in any way slice in, Kim Jong-Il cannot shun his responsibility. The government should strongly urge the North to make a formal apology and promise to prevent such incidents from recurring. Also needed is a serious discussion on the heretofore methodology to promote the Sunshine Policy in order to carry out a desirable policy toward North Korea in the future.