Warning against an `emotional` foreign policy

Although the summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush was held amidst some potential friction over the question of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the National Missile Defense (NMD), the leaders of the two countries wrapped up their Washington talks with relatively good results, somewhat relieving apprehensions over future Korea-U.S. relations.

For the Seoul government to bring a fruitful conclusion to the ongoing inter-Korean cooperation initiatives, needed is the promotion of various external conditions favorable to further progress. Of them, most important is the Washington`s support for Seoul`s rapprochement efforts.

Unlike the Clinton administration, the government of George W. Bush has a decidedly conservative outlook on North Korea. The Seoul government has endeavored to neutralize America`s hardline stance toward the North and President Kim`s visit to Washington is part of this effort. Given that the Bush administration was open-minded toward Seoul`s views on the North, there may have been little reason for the two leaders to underline the disparities in their respective positions. Though Washington still maintains a deep skepticism toward the perceived changes in North, the Bush government has not shown any opposition to the ongoing inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation efforts. It also has no grounds to underestimate the Korean government`s bid to establish peace on the peninsula, especially when the mood of detente is growing ahead of North Korean Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-Il`s planned visit to Seoul.

Through the Kim-Bush summit talks, the basic framework for mutual cooperation was reaffirmed, but as far as concrete steps are concerned, the government needs to acknowledge that the two sides have decidedly different perceptions of the North Korean regime. The Seoul government must realize that these differences must be addressed in the course of maintaining its openness to further changes in the North and in the entire region.

Needless to say, the most difference between Seoul and Washington is their divergent policy frameworks for dealing with the North Korea-related issues. For Seoul, the North Koreans are compatriots and partners for national unification and reconciliation. From the U.S. standpoint, on the other hand, there has been little change in Pyongyang`s stance toward the outside world and there have been no signs that Pyongyang has been faithfully living up to its external obligations.

The North Korean question is not restricted to these issues. Since the issue is closely related to the ongoing process of reshaping the Northeast Asian and global orders, it will affect the national interests not only of the United States but also China, Japan and Russia. Against this backdrop, the issue of Korean unification may be a matter close to the hearts of the people on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), but for the other powers surrounding the peninsula, the matter is a vital issue that does not allow for concessions.

To be cautioned against are resorts to both political propaganda and complicated sentimentalism. In the political process, all individual activities are considered to have some meaning irrespective of the will of the individual involved. Those who take actions without a full awareness of this fact are bound to run into trouble.

During the Kim-Bush summit, the U.S. backed Seoul`s North Korea policy in general, but made clear that it entertained deep skepticism about Pyongyang`s sincerity. Accordingly, the government ought to produce concrete evidence that the North has changed or is changing. In this regard, the North will have to show greater willingness to cooperate on the controversial issue of weapons of mass destruction, including missiles and nuclear arms. Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether the government has any effective plans to induce the North to comply with this requirement.

Park Sang-Sup, Prof. of international politics at Seoul National University