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[Opinion] Im-O Military Insurrection Remembered in Im-O Year

[Opinion] Im-O Military Insurrection Remembered in Im-O Year

Posted January. 07, 2002 09:19,   

한국어

The Im-O year has begun. According to history, the Im-O military insurrection took place in 1882. The currently popular TV drama `Myung Sung Hwang Woo`, the Im-O military insurrection is cast simply as a result of a power struggle between Taewongun and Queen Min.

This is the historical perspective of the colonized. The root cause of the insurrection is connected with the nature of family power politics and the challenge of dealing with outside influence.

The Choson kingdom firmly consolidated its identity as a cultural nation based on civilian administration.

In the latter part of the 19th century, heterogeneous Western imperialism was knocking on its doors. At the time, Taewongun was pursuing a major domestic reform such as taxing the yangban aristocracy and abolishing the Suhwon (private Confucian schools) which was the heart of Confucian pursuit of social harmony.

The 1866 Byung In Yang Yo (warding off the French warships) in the midst of these events was an event that awakened the nation`s awareness of Western superpower`s imperialist designs and the confidence that Korea could fight and overcome their attacks.

Intellectuals at the time viewed Western and Japanese demand to open the nation as an attempt to exchange their inferior products with our living necessaries and thought that opening the country could lead to the fall of the domestic economy.

The people felt such a sense of crisis because they were dealing with completely foreign elements and feared that they would have to engage in war. Taewongun established his territorial monuments all over the country because this kind of sentiment permeated the nation.

Furthermore, the late Choson society saw Northern Manchus as its primary intruders, robbers, and breakers of peace. Therefore, it refused to pay homage to the Ching and made revenge against the north its national policy.

On top of this, Choson saw itself as the most civilized nation and deemed itself the center of culture.

From the Choson perspective, the self-sufficient agrarian society was suddenly armed with cannons and warships, setting up monuments portraying the Western powers as Western Barbarians.

We can say that Taewongun faithfully carried out the traditional Choson policy of `internal reform and victory over foreign enemies`. Nonetheless, his ability to discern the signs of the time was one step behind the Min faction.

Min, who entered Kojong`s family out of duty, read the times correctly and showed a readiness to turn to an open policy. Min perceived that foreign elements were all too fast approaching and that establishing a relationship with the primary representative of foreign intrusion, Japan, was of utmost urgency. Starting with a treaty in 1876, Choson established a new relationship with Japan and sent a new emissary, Soo Shin Sa, rather than the former Tong Shin Sa.

In 1881, a new open policy began with the establishment of a new organization which dispatched emissaries to China in order to import arms and military technology, and to Japan in order to observe its modernization.

Min proceeded to conclude successive treaties with Western powers and formed a separate military division following the Japanese model. Choson pursued this open policy independently and with the direct backing of King Kojong and Queen Min.

However, the policy suffered the critical weakness of failing to elicit popular support and was driven by a small group of elites. Furthermore, the Min faction pursued the policy in the interest of maintaining their own power.

The result was the Im-O military insurrection. Dissatisfaction with unequal treatment given to the newly formed special division became the grounds for the regular troops` uprising and Taewongun`s return was inevitable.

After a century and many more decades since that incident, we are facing today the challenge of finding our direction in the massive changes of globalization.

It goes without saying that both a complete turn to foreign power without any substantial ground and an unconditional rejection of foreign influence are dangerous. One clear things, however, is that we must not repeat the same mistake again.

We are at a point in time when we need to think carefully about what we can learn from history. The direction that the nation will take must not be decided on the superficial level of maintaining power, but in a long-term perspective that plans for the next hundred years.

If the year of the horse demands change, we must use it as an opportunity.

Chung Ok-Ja (Seoul National University, Professor of Korean History, Guest Editorial Writer)