[Opinion] North Korea`s Dangerous Refusal to Resume Dialogue

The U.S. government made an official announcement of the intent to resume dialogue with North Korea in June and NK has hitherto replied with a flat `No`. Since June, NK has responded to U.S. proposal for talks in the following manner.

First, the U.S. has raised nuclear weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons as items to be discussed but the first item to be discussed is the issue of compensation for past history. Second, the conventional weapon and armed force issue is aimed at disarming North Korea. The U.S. must withdraw its troops first. Third, the U.S. must respect the autonomy of NK and stop its antagonistic policy that seeks to crush NK by pressuring it. Fourth, the two nations must begin by discussing how to execute the agreements already made. Fifth, the U.S. must resume talks at the level of cooperation reached between the NK-U.S. at the end of President Clinton`s term.

Why is the NK passive about the NK-U.S. dialogue? NK must have many things to consider. First, the George W. Bush administration`s strong stance on the issues facing both nations must make NK think that they cannot get the desired results. NK probably perceives that the U.S. stance has become stronger after September 11 and NK has become a lower priority for the U.S. Furthermore, NK probably feels that the global situation is extremely disadvantageous to itself. If the summit talks between NK, Russia, and China had a side aim of stopping the resumption NK-U.S. talks, Russia and China`s cooperative stance toward the U.S. after September 11 would have weakened the conditions for North Korea.

Moreover, U.S. air attacks on Afghanistan is causing NK to worry about national security and take a cautious stance. The rationale used to justify attacks against the Taliban may be used against NK as well in the future. The heightened sense of crisis in security will bring the country together and the intensification of anti-American dogma in the realm of policy will overshadow the moderate intention to cooperate with the U.S.

NK sees unpredictability , instability, extremism, and irrationality in policy as an effective negotiation strategy with the U.S. NK may think that the U.S. must provide compensation and that NK had to demand changes in the American position and other substantial conditions. Most of all, NK feels that it must secure U.S. agreement on the joint statement by NK and the U.S. in October, 2000.

NK is hesitant also because of the rigidity of the policy making process. Being cautious about reviewing NK strategy in dealing with the U.S. may be a reason why, but American President George W. Bush`s skeptical statements about North Korean leader Kim Jung Il made NK even more closed up. The extent and degree of denunciatory attack on Mr. Bush in the North Korean media indicates the level of North Korean anger about Mr. Bush`s statement and such statements had significant influence on North Korean policy making process.

Terrorist attacks on the U.S. are spreading in various ways and the U.S. response is solidifying. It is urgent, therefore, to resume talks between NK and the U.S. Disregarding the reasons and NK`s outright refusal to talk will only be disadvantageous to both sides in the end. NK, who is demanding that the U.S. change its NK policy, will have to resume talks with the U.S. and find a compromise.

Continued absence of talks between NK and the U.S. will harm the essential building of mutual trust between the two countries and make it difficult for NK to participate in the global economy. It may, furthermore, cause other nations such as Japan to take greater caution against NK and put a stop to relations.

It is best for NK and the U.S. to use various means to plan an official meeting and put it on their agenda by next Spring at the latest. Once the talks resume, the meetings will hit tough obstacles in the long run, but the danger of a crisis erupting in the Korean peninsula will be reduced. NK-U.S. talks are urgent also in order to prevent political, economic, and social crises which are expected next year in South Korean politics.

Kim Young Jin (George Washington University, Honorary Professor of International Political Science)