[Current topic] Grasp Washington`s real interest

Following the arrival of the George W. Bush administration, concern is rising over emerging friction between Seoul and Washington in their North Korea policy.

A change of government is certain to bring about a change of policy. It thus is a matter of course that various projections and concerns might be raised in connection with the North Korea policy of the Republican administration. Since the new Washington government`s perception of and approach to Pyongyang has shown some difference from those of the Seoul government it might well be expected that the two allies would have to coordinate their policies toward North Korea the hard way.

However, it might be premature to play up a potential Seoul-Washington conflict as a fait accompli with reference to remarks made by some personalities when major policy posts are yet to be filled in Washington. Advocacy of a nationalistic response warning against deference to U.S. initiatives is rash and untimely, doing little service to ROK-U.S. ties.

The Seoul-Washington partnership regarding North Korea is nothing new. During the presidency of Kim Young-Sam the partnership had been preoccupied with the consequence of developing relations between Washington and Pyongyang, while inter-Korean relationship was almost frozen. Since the advent of the incumbent government the situation has reversed and the partnership concentrated on adjusting the dovish sunshine policy of Seoul to Washington`s policy in the midst of misgivings about North Korean nuclear weapons and missile development.

The two countries refurbished their partnership through the so-called Perry process. The summit talks of the two Koreas introduced a new subtle element into their bilateral relations. The Republican Party came to take over at a time when Seoul and Washington were keeping step with each other with President Clinton making his last-ditch attempt to befriend North Korea.

A meeting of the foreign policy chiefs of the two allies Feb. 7 in Washington will get South Korea and the United States under the new president off to a new start and into high gear. Over the past several years the challenging factors and patterns of the Korean-American partnership changed, but the requirements for an effective partnership remain unchanged. Two things are worthy of notice in this connection.

First, America`s interest and priority in the Korean peninsula need to be understood correctly. The problem of the Korean peninsula is our problem, and as such it has to be resolved by us. At the same time, the threat of North Korean missiles and the menacing presence of massive conventional arms of North Korea as mentioned of late by Secretary of State Colin Powell constitute a major problem that has direct bearing upon the United States keeping 37,000 troops here. We should understand that Washington stands its own solid ground on the issues for its own national interest. Only asking Washington to support our own position on the ground that the Korean question is our problem will get both sides nowhere.

Central to the bilateral partnership will be the formulation of strategies based on their common ground supported by a correct grasp and recognition of the interests and priorities of each other. The untowardness that evolved between Seoul and Washington after the inter-Korean summit was partly caused by the failure of the Seoul government to press North Korea hard enough on the missile issue, which is the key U.S. concern.

Second, there must be a frank exchange of objective opinions on the current situation of the Korean peninsula. How do we look at North Korea? Is North Korea changing in reality? These questions should be fully discussed. Disparity in the fundamental perception of reality is bound to make policy adjustment difficult and sow the seed of constant discord in addressing specific problems. It is necessary to let Washington know of the latest progress in inter-Korean relations, but any evaluation founded not on clear and objective proof but on ambiguous intentions would be hardly convincing. This must be well kept in mind.

President Kim Dae-Jung said North Korea conceded on such issues as U.S. military presence in Korea, the National Security Law and the federal formula of unification, concluding that the South got more than it gave. But Washington can hardly be brought around to this kind of argument. Persuading the United States requires an objective and convincing perception of reality. Common strategies could be pursued only on the basis of correct assessment of facts concerning the fruits of the inter-Korean summit and its drawbacks in the relationship between the two Koreas.

The most important thing is to realize there is no effective alternative to a close ROK-U.S. partnership in deterring the present threat of North Korea and inducing its change. Difficulties involving the partnership never should tempt a complacent conception that South and North Korea should work it out on their own independently. Endorsement and support of the people, together with steady cooperation with allies, is essential to successful implementation of North Korea policies.

Paik Jin-Hyun, professor of area studies institute, Seoul National University